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APPORTIONMENT OF DAMAGES IN SECTION 301
DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION ACTIONS:
THE IMPACT OF BOWEN V. UNITED STATES
POSTAL SER VICE
Steven L. Murray *
In Bowen v. United States Postal Service,I the United States Supreme Court
established a new standard for apportioning damages in cases in which an
aggrieved employee sues the employer for breach of a collective bargaining
agreement and the union for breach of its duty of fair representation. The
Court held that when an employee has been wrongfully discharged, his union
may be held primarily liable for the increase in the employee's damages caused
by the union's breach of its duty of fair representation. This holding departs
significantly from established precedent and dramatically increases the union's
potential liability in such cases.
This article will analyze the impact of Bowen on the traditional collective
bargaining relationship and on national labor policy. The first section outlines
the development of the union's duty of fair representation and the right
of action under section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act of
1947.2 The second section examines the judicial precedent, established prior
to Bowen, regarding the apportionment of damages between the union and
the employer in section 301 suits. The Bowen opinion is discussed in the
third section. The final section analyzes the scope of Bowen, its relationship
to prior precedent, and its impact on the traditional collective bargaining
* Staff Attorney, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen
& Helpers of America, Washington, D.C. B.A., Eastern Illinois University, 1978; J.D., Saint
Louis University, 1981; LL.M., Labor Law, Georgetown University Law Center, 1983. The
views expressed herein are solely those of the author.
1. 103 S. Ct. 588 (1983). For commentary regarding Bowen, see B. FELDACKER, LABOR
GUIDE TO LABOR LAW 388-89 (2d ed. 1983); Allred, The Bowen Decision: Mandate for Re-
examination of Apportionment of Damages in Fair Representation Cases, 34 LAB. L.J. 408
(1983); VanderVelde, A Fair Process Model for the Union's Fair Representation Duty, 67 MINN.
L. REV. 1079, 1161 n.232, 233 (1983); A. Hajjar, remarks at the American Bar Association's
Section of Labor and Employment Law (Aug. 4, 1983), reprinted in 113 LAB. REL. REP. 316
(BNA) (Aug. 15, 1983); W. Isaacson, remarks at the American Arbitration Association's
Arbitration Day (May 18, 1983), reprinted in 1983 D. LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 100, D-1; D.
Wollett, remarks at the American Bar Association's Section of Labor and Employment Law
(Aug. 1, 1983), reprinted in 1983 D. LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 151, D-1.
2. Section 301(a) states:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter,
or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of
the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount
in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
29 U.S.C. § 301 (1976).
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relationship. The article concludes that Bowen fails to serve the traditional
interests and goals of the national labor policy.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
AND THE SECTION 301 CAUSE OF ACTION
A. Duty of Fair Representation
The duty of fair representation is a judicially created doctrine derived from
the union's statutory right to act as the exclusive representative of all the
employees in a designated bargaining unit.3 Section 9(a) of the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA) provides that a union elected by a majority of the
employees in a bargaining unit for purposes of collective bargaining, shall
be the exclusive representative of those employees in negotiating the terms
of a collective bargaining agreement with the employer.' In such an agree-
ment, the union may establish itself as the employees' exclusive represen-
tative in the contractual grievance procedure, which provides individual
employees with remedies for the employer's breach of the collective bargaining
agreement.6
This exclusivity principle is a critical mechanism for accomplishing the ob-
jectives that Congress sought to achieve by enacting the NLRA and pro-
moting collective bargaining. The Act was designed to ensure employee self-
determination, to protect employees' rights, and to promote industrial peace
and stability7 by advancing democratic ideals in the area of labor rela-
3. Note, The Duty of Fair Representation in Grievance Administration: A Specific Test
Modeled on Judge Bazelon's Dissent in United States v. DeCoster, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
185 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note, Duty of Fair Representation in Grievance Administrationl.
4. Section 9(a) provides:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by
the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes shall be
the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such a unit for the purposes
of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment,
or other conditions of employment: Provided, That any individual employee or
a group of employees shall have the right at any time to present grievances to their
employer and to have such grievances adjusted, without the intervention of the
bargaining representative, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the
terms of the collective-bargaining contract or agreement then in effect: Provided
further, That the bargaining representative has been given opportunity to be pre-
sent at such adjustment.
29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976).
5. See Note, Duty of Fair Representation in Grievance Administration, supra note 3, at
185-86.
6. Id. at 186 n.8.
7. Section 1 of the NLRA discusses how the economy was hindered before the promulga-
tion of the Act:
The denial by some employers of the right of employees to organize and the refusal
by some employers to accept the procedure of collective bargaining led to strikes
and other forms of industrial strife or unrest, which have the intent or the necessary
effect of burdening or obstructing commerce by (a) impairing the efficiency, safety,
or operation of the instrumentalities of commerce; (b) occurring in the current of
[Vol. 32:743
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tions.8 Congress believed that viable collective bargaining could be achieved only
by giving one representative the exclusive right to bargain on behalf of all
the employees within a given bargaining unit.9 As a result of this exclusive
representation requirement, the union has a duty to represent fairly all of
the employees in the bargaining unit.'" This duty applies to collective bargain-
ing with the employer" and to enforcement of the resulting agreement.' 2
commerce; (c) materially affecting, restraining, or controlling the flow of raw
materials or manufactured or processed goods from or into the channels of com-
merce or the prices of such materials or good in commerce; or (d) causing diminu-
tion of employment and wages in such volume as substantially to impair or disrupt
the market for goods flowing from or into the channels of commerce.
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
8. The NLRA was created under the presumption that democracy is an indivisible system.
By viewing the employer-employee relationship as one of the most common and important
spheres of economic activity, Congress sought to extend democratic methods of decision making
into this sphere in order to assure the survival of our economic and political systems.
9. The policy reasons behind the exclusive bargaining agent are expressed in the legislative
history of the NLRA and in several judicial interpretations of the Act. One of the major policy
reasons reiterated in the case law is that a single representative is necessary to adequately pro-
tect workers' interests in negotiations with the employer. This policy is based upon the premise
that the strength and bargaining power of the group as a whole are greater than the sum total
of each of its individual members. For instance, in J.1. Case v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944),
the Court noted that "[t]he very purpose of providing by statute for the collective agreement
is to supersede the terms of separate agreements of employees with terms which reflect the
strength and bargaining power and serve the welfare of the group." Id. at 338. The Court
reasoned that by allowing individual bargaining, an employer is better able to retard the ad-
vances in wages and working conditions that come more readily from a united group effort.
Id. An exclusive bargaining agent thus increases the employees' bargaining power and thereby
provides protection for the individual worker's interests.
A second policy reason underlying the exclusivity requirement is that it affords equal treat-
ment to each member of the bargaining unit. The legislative history of § 9(a) stresses that
the primary purpose of the exclusivity principle is to preserve an orderly procedure for collec-
tive bargaining by precluding an employer from bargaining with splinter groups. The House
Report summarizes this purpose by stating:
There cannot be two or more basic agreements applicable to workers in given unit;
this is virtually conceded on all sides. If the employer should fail to give equally
advantageous terms to nonmembers of the labor organization negotiating the agree-
ment, there would immediately result a marked increase in the membership of that
labor organization. On the other hand, if better terms were given to nonmembers,
this would give rise to bitterness and strife, and a wholly unworkable arrangement
whereby men performing comparable duties were paid according to different scales
of wages and hours. Clearly then, there must be one basic scale, and it must apply
to all.
H.R. REP. No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935), reprinted in If NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 1935, at 3069 (1949). An exclusive bargaining agent
prevents this kind of strife and instability by taking a single, unified position that protects
the interests of the workers as a whole in its relationship with the employer.
10. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967); Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323
U.S. 192, 202-03 (1944).
11. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 177; Syres v. Oil Workers Local 23, 350 U.S. 892 (1962); Ford Motor
Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
12. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 177; Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964). For a discus-
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In Vaca v. Sipes,'3 the Supreme Court established the current standard
for evaluating a union's representation of its bargaining units. Under this
standard, a union breaches its duty of fair representation if its "conduct
toward a member of the collective bargaining unit is arbitrary, discriminatory
or in bad faith." I4 The Vaca Court stated that a union may neither arbitrarily
ignore an employee's meritorious grievance nor process it in a perfunctory
manner." Finally, the Court stressed that the duty of fair representation
stands "as a bulwark to prevent arbitrary union conduct against individuals
stripped of traditional forms of redress by the provisions of federal labor
law.," 6
B. The Section 301 Cause of Action
In Smith v. Evening News Association,'7 the Supreme Court held that
an employee has an individual right to sue an employer for breach of a
collective bargaining agreement under section 301(a)'8 of the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act of 1947. This right is limited by the requirement that
before proceeding with a section 301 suit, an employee must attempt to
exhaust the grievance and arbitration procedures provided in the collective
bargaining agreement.' 9 The employee must also attempt to exhaust her in-
ternal union remedies prior to suing the union, for breach of its duty of
fair representation, and the employer, for breach of the collective bargain-
ing agreement.2"
These exhaustion requirements are not absolute. In Clayton v. Automobile
Workers,2 the Supreme Court established that an employee is not required
sion of the distinction between a union's duty in grievance administration and its duty in col-
lective bargaining, see generally Leffler, Piercing the Duty of Fair Representation: The Dichotomy
Between Negotiations and Grievance Handling, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 35 (1979); Levine & Hollander,
Union's Duty of Fair Representation in Contract Administration, 7 EMP. REL. L.J. 193 (1981).
13. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
14. Id. at 190. For extensive commentary on the proper standard for evaluating the union's
conduct, see generally Cheit, Competing Models of Fair Representation: The Perfunctory Pro-
cessing Cases, 24 B.C.L. REV. 1 (1982); Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 663 (1973); Flynn & Higgins, Fair Representation: A Survey
of the Contemporary Framework and a Proposed Change in the Duty Owed to the Employee,
8 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1096 (1974); Steinhauer, IBEW v. Foust: A Hint of Negligence in the
Duty of Fair Representation, 32 HASTINGs L.J. 1041 (1981); VanderVelde, supra note 1; Note,
The Duty of Fair Representation: The Emerging Standard of the Union 's Duty in the Context
of Negligent Arbitrary or Perfunctory Grievance Administration, 46 Mo. L. REV. 142 (1981);
Note, Determining Standards for a Union's Duty of Fair Representation: The Case for Or-
dinary Negligence, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 34 (1980).
15. 386 U.S. at 191.
16. Id. at 182.
17. 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
18. See supra note 2 for text of § 301(a).
19. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
20. Clayton v. Automobile Workers, 451 U.S. 679 (1981).
21. 451 U.S. 679, 685 (1981). For a discussion of this case see Note, Clayton v. UAW:
A Temporary Reprieve from the Exhaustion of Internal Union Appeals in Duty of Fair Represen-
tation Actions, 31 CATH. U.L. REV. 311 (1982).
[Vol. 32:743
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to exhaust her internal union remedies when such procedures would be futile
or would provide an inadequate remedy. Similarly, in Vaca, the Court held
that an employee is not required to exhaust her contractual remedies when
her employer repudiates the exclusive contractual procedure or when the union
breaches its duty of fair representation.22
When the contractual exhaustion bar is removed, however, an employee
may bring suit against both his union and employer, notwithstanding the
finality of the contractual remedial procedure.23 This action is characterized
as a "hybrid § 301 and breach of duty suit." '2 4 Finally, such a suit com-
prises two causes of action. The suit against the employer is founded on
section 301 because the employee is alleging a breach of the collective bargain-
ing agreement.25 The action against the union is one for breach of the duty
of fair representation, a judicially developed concept implied from the
NLRA.2
6
In Del Costello v. Teamsters,27 the Supreme Court characterized these two
claims as "inextricably interdependent." 2 The Court held that to prevail
against either his union or employer, the employee must prove that the union
breached its duty and that the employer violated the collective bargaining
agreement.29 Therefore, before an employee may even litigate his section 301
claim against his employer, he must prove that his union breached its duty
of fair representation. If the court decides that the union has not breached
its duty, the suit is properly dismissed because the employer has no liability
unless the union violated its duty of fair representation. 0 When the union
is found to have breached its duty, the court will decide whether the employer
breached the collective bargaining agreement. 3 Consequently, even though
the union violated its duty, the employee may lose his suit if the court finds
that the employer did not breach the contract.32
The primary remedies33 available to an employee in a hybrid section 301
22. 386 U.S. at 185; see Del Costello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 103 S. Ct. 2281,
2290 (1983).
23. Del Costello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 103 S. Ct. 2281, 2290 (1983).
24. United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 66 (1981).
25. Del Costello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 103 S. Ct. 281, 2290 (1983).
26. Id.
27. 103 S. Ct. 2281 (1983).
28. Id. at 2290 (citing United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 66-67 (Stewart,
J., concurring)).
29. Id.
30. B. FELDACKER, supra note 1, at 386.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Coverage of the duty of fair representation in the-context of unfair labor practices
is beyond the scope of this article. In general, a union's breach of its duty of fair represen-
tation may violate §§ 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2) of the NLRA. The NLRB has reasoned that a
union's breach of its obligation under § 9 of the Act to represent all of the employees fairly
results in an infringement of the employee's § 7 right and therefore constitutes a § 8(b)(1)(A)
violation. Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), rev'd, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
A union's breach of its duty of fair representation may also violate § 8(b)(2) because arbitrary
union conduct may adversely affect an employee and tend to encourage or discourage union
19831
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suit3" are compensatory damages in the form of back pay,35 attorney fees36
and litigation costs, and reinstatement or prospective future losses if reinstate-
membership. Id. See generally AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF LABOR AND EMPLOY-
MENT LAW, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 1308-11 (2d ed. 1.983) (discussion of Board rulings
that a union's breach of its duty of fair representation violates §§ 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2))
[hereinafter cited as Tr DEVELOPING LABOR LAW]. In cases in which the union and the employer
are guilty of unfair labor practices involving a breach of duty by the union, the Board has
held the union and employer jointly and severally liable for any lost earnings caused by their
wrongful conduct. Id. at 1344; see, e.g., Kaiser Co., 259 N.L.R.B. 1 (1981) (the union was
held responsible for the grievant's back pay until the date the union obtained consideration
of his grievance by the prior position, or the date he acquired substantially equivalent employ-
ment elsewhere); Pacific Coast Utils. Serv., Inc., 238 N.L.R.B. 599 (1978), enforced, 638 F.2d
73 (9th Cir. 1980). See generally Schwartz, The National Labor Relations Board and the Duty
of Fair Representation, 34 LAB. L.J. 781 (1983).
34. See THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 33, at 1347-58; Note, Duty of Fair Represen-
tation in Grievance Administration, supra note 3, at 188 n.12; Comment, Apportionment of
Damages in DFR/Contract Suits: Who Pays For the Union's Breach, 1981 Wis. L. REV. 155,
162-63 [hereinafter cited as Comment, Apportionment of Damages].
35. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 33, at 1348 n.320 ("Back pay is measured
as the difference between what the plaintiff actually earned, or with the exercise of due diligence
could have earned, and what he would have earned but for the breach.")
36. Attorney fees are routinely awarded in hybrid § 301 suits. See Seymour v. Olin Corp.,
666 F.2d 202, 215-16 (5th Cir. 1983); Milstead v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 649 F.2d
395, 396 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 896 (1981); Self v. Drivers, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen
and Helpers Local Union No. 61, 620 F.2d 439, 444 (4th Cir. 1981); Scott v. Local Union
377, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 548 F.2d 1244, 1246 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 968 (1977);
THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 33, at 1350.
The courts have held the union solely liable for the employee's attorney fees, Seymour, 666
F.2d 202 (5th Cir. 1983), or apportioned the liability for such fees between the union and
the employer. See Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 470 F. Supp. 1127 (W.D. Va. 1979),
rev'd on other grounds, 642 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 588 (1983); Holodnak
v. Avco Corp., 381 F. Supp. 191 (D. Conn. 1974), aff'd in part and rev'd on other grounds,
514 F.2d 285 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 892 (1975); Comment, Apportionment of Damages,
supra note 34, at 173 n.128.
The courts, however, have been inconsistent in analyzing the union's liability for attorney
fees. In Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 420 (1975), the Supreme
Court reaffirmed the traditional American rule regarding attorney fees. This rule provides that
attorney fees may not be recovered by the prevailing party in federal litigation in the absence
of authorizing legislation. There is no federal statute providing for the recovery of attorney
fees in an action against the union for breach of the duty of fair representation. Hardesty
v. Essex Group, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 752 (N.D. Ind. 1982), In Alyeska, the Court recognized
certain exceptions to the American rule. These exceptions apply when a party recovers or preserves
a fund for the benefit of others in addition to himself, or "when the losing party has 'acted
in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.' " Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 258-59
(quoting F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129
(1974)).
In Richardson v. Communication Workers of Am., 530 F.2d 126 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 824 (1976), the court held that the union's intentional failure to discharge its duty
of fair representation to nonmember employees represented bad faith and justified the plain-
tiff's right to recover attorney fees under Alyeska's bad faith exception. In Emmanuel v. Omaha
Carpenters Dist. Council, 422 F. Supp. 204, 210-11 (D. Neb. 1976), aff'd, 560 F.2d 382 (8th
Cir. 1977), the court awarded attorney fees under Alyeska's common benefit exception. The
Emmanuel court held that the plaintiff's suit rendered a service to the union and the persons
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ment is not feasible.37 In IBEW v. Foust," the Supreme Court held that
punitive damages are not recoverable against a union for breaching its duty
of fair representation. Moreover, courts have awarded damages for mental
distress, but only in those exceptional cases in which the employee has suf-
fered an actual injury because of extreme and malicious treatment by the
union.9
The issue of apportioning damages between the union and the employer"0
must be addressed after the liability issues have been resolved. Controversy
over the apportionment issue has increased in the wake of the Supreme
Court's decision in Bowen v. United States Postal Service.
it represented. In a recent case, Dutrisac v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 113 L.R.R.M. 3532 (9th
Cir. 1983), the court held that the award of attorney fees "assessed against the union represented
damages, not attorneys fees per se .. " Id. at 3537. Thus, the award did not violate the
American rule. Id.; see also Foster v. Bowman Transp. Co., 562 F. Supp. 806, 818 (N.D.
Ala. 1983) (the plaintiff was awarded attorney fees, incurred in the prosecution of his claim
against the employer, as part of his ordinary damages recoverable against the union). But see
Cronin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 588 F.2d 616 (8th Cir. 1978) (attorney fees incurred in
§ 301 actions do not have the status of compensatory damages).
37. It is established that reinstatement, if practical, is a proper remedy in a § 301 cause
of action. De Arroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packinghouse, 425 F.2d 281, 291 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970). In cases in which reinstatement is impractical for any or
all of the parties involved, such as when circumstances have changed and a significant period
of time has lapsed since an employee's discharge, an award for future lost earnings is appropriate.
Id. at 292; see also Soto Segarra v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 581 F.2d 291, 297 (1st Cir. 1978).
Courts have established that the difficult problems of proving future lost earnings should
not preclude a court from awarding prospective damages, nor force the parties to accept the
more drastic remedy of reinstatement. Thompson v. Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, 367
F.2d 489, 493 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 960 (1967).
In De Arroyo, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that an award of future lost
earnings was an appropriate remedy provided it was apportioned between the union and the
employer in accordance with the principles established in Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967),
and Czosek v. O'Mara, 397 U.S. 25 (1970). The court noted that Vaca does not preclude an
award of properly apportioned future damages. De Arroyo, 425 F.2d at 292 n.14. For cases
in which awards for prospective damages were found to be appropriate, see Smith v. Hussman,
449 U.S. 839 (1980); Thompson, 367 F.2d 489, 492-93 (4th Cir. 1966); Bowen v. United States
Postal Serv., 470 F. Supp. 1127, 1131 (W.D. Va. 1974), rev'd, 642 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1981),
rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 588 (1983).
38. 442 U.S. 42 (1979).
39. Farmer v. ARA Servs., Inc., 660 F.2d 1096, 1107 (6th Cir. 1981) (the union participated
in the employer's breach of collective bargaining agreement and negotiated sexually discriminatory
contractual provisions); Richardson v. Communications Workers of Am., 443 F.2d 974, 982
(8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 818 (1973) (the union subjected the nonunion grievant
to several months of verbal and physical abuse, in addition to wrongfully inducing the employer
to discharge the grievant and acting in bad faith in refusing to process the plaintiff's grievance);
Rogers v. Fedco Freight Lines, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1169, 1170 (S.D. Ohio 1983); Soto Segarra
v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 550 F. Supp. 752, 767 (N.D. Ind. 1982); Murphy v. Operating Eng'rs,
Local 18, 99 L.R.R.M. 2074, 2124, 2132 (N.D. Ohio 1978) (the union acted in an outrageous
and malicious fashion in breaching .its duty of fair representation; it denied the plaintiff his
rights under the collective bargaining agreement by engaging in intentional and severe discrimina-
tion regarding employment referrals).
40. For articles addressing the issue of apportionment of damages between the union and
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II. ESTABLISHED JUDICIAL PRECEDENT ON THE
ISSUE OF APPORTIONMENT OF DAMAGES
A. Supreme Court Decisions
The Supreme Court first specifically addressed the apportionment issue
in Vaca v. Sipes." In that case, the Court established the governing princi-
ple for apportioning damages between the union and the employer.42 In Vaca,
a discharged employee filed suit against his union and his former employer.
The employee alleged that he had been discharged in violation of a collec-
tive bargaining agreement and that "the union had arbitrarily, capriciously
and without just or reasonable reason or cause"''4 refused to process his
grievance to arbitration, thus breaching its duty of fair representation." The
employee complained that the union failed to furnish him with the arbitra-
tion remedy against the employer provided for in the collective bargaining
agreement."5 The grievant's remedial claim was based on damages he incur-
red as a direct result of the employer's breach of contract.46
The Vaca Court found that the union had not breached its duty of fair
representation. Nevertheless, focusing on the facts before it, the Court pro-
ceeded to analyze the apportionment issue. The Court held that an award
of damages against the union cannot include "damages attributable solely
to the employer's breach of contract." 4 Justice White, writing for the
majority, explained that when a union violates its duty by failing to process
a grievance, it is the employer's unrelated breach of the collective bargain-
ing agreement, by the wrongful discharge of the employee, that initiates the
controversy and causes this portion of the employee's damages. The Court
stated that the employee should have no difficulty recovering such damages
from the employer, "who cannot . . .hide behind the union's wrongful
failure to act." 48
employer, see Linsey, The Apportionment of Liability for Damages Between Employer and
Union in § 301 Actions Involving a Union's Breach of Its Duty of Fair Representation, 30
MERCER L. REv. 661 (1979); Martucci, Employer Liability for Union Unfair Representation:
The Judicial Prediction and Underlying Policy Considerations, 46 Mo. L. REV. 78 (1981); Com-
ment, Apportionment of Damages, supra note 34; Note, A Proposal for Apportioning Damages
in Fair Representation Suits, 14 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 497 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Note,
A Proposal for Apportioning Damages].
41. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
42. See Linsey, supra note 40, at 669.
43. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 173.
44. The plaintiff had been discharged due to poor health. The union had filed a grievance
on his behalf and processed it through the fourth step, the last step prior to arbitration. The
union then procured a third medical opinion and voted not to take the grievance to arbitration
when the medical evidence did not support the plaintiff. Id. at 174-75.
45. Id. at 173.
46. Id. at 195.
47. Id. at 197.
48. Id. The Court further stated that even if the failure to resort to arbitration had violated
the union's duty to the employee, there was no reason to exempt the employer from contrac-
tual damages he would otherwise have to pay. This holding has generated much controversy.
[Vol. 32:743
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The majority in Vaca implicitly recognized the union's financial interest
in the context of employee suits under section 301. The Court noted that
a union could suffer "a real hardship" if it had to pay the damages resulting
from the employer's wrongful conduct, even if the union possessed a right
of indemnification against the employer. 9 To prevent unjustly punishing the
union for the employer's wrongs, the Court determined that an apportion-
ment of damages between the union and the employer was proper when each
contributed to the employee's damages.5"
The Vaca Court then established the standard for apportioning damages
between the union and the employer, stating:
The governing principle, then, is to apportion liability between the
employer and the union according to the damage caused by the fault of
each. Thus, damages attributable solely to the employer's breach of con-
tract should not be charged to the union, but increases if any in those
damages caused by the union's refusal to process the grievance should
not be charged to the employer. In this case, even if the Union had
breached its duty, all or almost all of [the employee's] damages would
still be attributable to his allegedly wrongful discharge by [the employer].'
In a footnote, the majority set out a key factual distinction regarding the
application of the governing apportionment principle.52 The Court emphasized
that its analysis was not directed to a situation in which the union "has
affirmatively caused" the employer's alleged breach of contract.53 According
to Vaca, in those situations the National Labor Relations Board has found
both the union and the employer guilty of an unfair labor practice. In such
cases, the Board has held the union and the employer jointly and severally
liable for any back pay owed to the particular employee who was the sub-
ject of the joint discrimination.5" Although it did not decide if such an ap-
proach was'proper for a hybrid section 301 suit, the Court stated that joint
liability was inappropriate when the union played no role in the employer's
See, e.g., Linsey, supra note 40, at 679 (holding the employer liable for damages caused by
the union's breach imposes the duty of fair representation on the employer as well as the union);
Note, A Proposal for Apportioning Damages, supra note 40, at 501 (Vaca implies that the
employer is liable for the bulk of damages in duty of fair representation suits, with the union
liable only for any increases caused by its breach).
49. 386 U.S. at 197. Even if the employer indemnified the union, the union would still
have to pay attorney costs and would also lose time and the use of the money used to pay
the employee's damages stemming from the employer's conduct. For differing viewpoints as
to whether the financial vulnerability of the union should be considered in apportioning damages
in § 301 suits, compare Comment, Apportionment of Damages, supra note 34, at 177 (even
if union finances are in need of protection there is no reason to make the employer the shield)
with Note, IBEW v. Foust: A Hint of Negligence in the Duty of Fair Representation, 32 HASTINGS
L.J. 1041, 1059 (the union must maintain sufficient financial resources to police the contract;
vulnerability of the union treasury is a legitimate reason to limit the scope of the union's liability).
50. 386 U.S. at 196-97.
51. Id. at 197-98.
52. Id. at 197 n.18.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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breach of the contract and the employer did not participate in the union's
breach of duty.5
In Czosek v. O'Mara,5 6 the Court addressed the apportionment issue and
the related concept of the role of an alternative grievance procedure. In
Czosek, the employees were furloughed and never recalled by their employer.
The employees sued their employer for wrongful discharge and their union
for breaching its duty of fair representation by refusing to process their
grievances.57
In addressing the issue of apportionment, the Czosek Court applied Vaca's
governing principle." The union contended that it could not be sued ex-
clusively when the employees' damages were a result of a wrongful discharge
by the employer prior to the union's alleged breach of duty. 9 The Court,
explaining that the union would not be responsible for damages for which
the employer was wholly or partly liable, stated that the union could be
held liable only for damages that flowed directly from its own conduct. 0
Czosek also addressed the apportionment issue in the context of an employer's
wrongful discharge, independent of any union misconduct, and a subsequent
breach of the union's duty by refusing to process the grievances based on
the discharge. In this context, the Court held that "damages against the
union for loss of employment are unrecoverable except to the extent that
its refusal to handle the grievance[s] added to the difficulty and expense
of collecting from the employer." '6'
Subsequent to its decision in Czosek, the Court in Hines v. Anchor Motor
Freight, Inc.62 expressly recognized the employer's responsibility for a
wrongful discharge. The employees' grievances, based on their discharge for
dishonesty, were processed through the arbitration procedure established by
55. Id.
56. 397 U.S. 25 (1970).
57. Id. at 26. The employees sued their employer for wrongful discharge under the Railway
Labor Act (RLA) and under an agreement entered into between the employer and its employees.
The Court affirmed the appellate court's decision that the employees' complaint was sufficient
to allege a breach of duty by the union, notwithstanding their failure to pursue their administrative
remedies under the RLA.
58. Id. at 28.
59. Id. The appellate court dismissed the complaint against the employer because it failed
to allege that the employer took part in the union's breach of duty. Neither the employees
nor the employer challenged this ground for dismissal. Id. The union, on the other hand, did
raise this issue before the Supreme Court. Id.
60. Id. at 29.
61. Id. The Czosek decision clarified the issue of what constitutes an increase in damages
for which the union is liable. See Note, A Proposal for Apportioning Damages, supra note
40, at 502 (Czosek rule limits employer's liability to damages related to loss of employ-
ment, such as contractual back pay and benefits; the union's liability extends only to added
expenses the employee incurs in collecting from the employer, such as attorney fees and court
costs). This author interprets Czosek as separating damages on the basis of the duty owed
to the employee. Employment duty is contractual and, thus, contractual damages are delegated
to the employer. Since the union's duty is to represent, the cost of securing outside counsel
is on the union. Id. at 506.
62. 424 U.S. 554 (1976).
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the collective bargaining agreement. Subsequent to an arbitration decision
in favor of the employer, the employees discovered evidence supporting their
claim that they had acted honestly. The employees then sued their employer
for wrongful discharge and their union for breach of its duty of fair represen-
tation. The employees argued that the union could have discovered the falsity
of the employer's charges with minimal investigation.63 The Court held that
the dismissed employees were entitled to relief against both the union and
the employer if they could prove an erroneous discharge by the employer
and a breach of the union's duty of fair representation that tainted the deci-
sion of the joint arbitration panel."
The Hines majority rejected the argument that the employer should escape
liability on the basis of the federal labor policy favoring arbitration and
the finality of the grievance procedure. The Court reasoned that the employer
was originally responsible for the discharge. If the charges of dishonesty
were in error, the employer played a role in initiating the dispute.6" The
Court held that the employees were not foreclosed from bringing a section
301 suit against their employer if their remedies under the collective bargaining
agreement were severely limited by the union's breach of duty.66 Therefore,
the union's breach of its duty relieves the employee of any requirement that
his grievance be settled through the established contractual procedures. 7
Justice Stewart, in a concurring opinion, directly addressed the issue of
apportioning liability for damages. He agreed with the majority opinion that
proof of the union's breach of duty would remove the bar of finality from
the arbitration award.68 He contended, however, that this premise did not
mean that proof of the union's breach would render an employer potential-
ly liable for the employee's back pay, accruing from the time of the "tainted"
arbitration decision until a fair and final determination that the employer
wrongfully discharged the employees. 69 Justice Stewart argued that an
employer, relying in good faith on a favorable decision, is justified in fail-
ing to reinstate the discharged employee until there is a contrary
determination.7" Therefore, he concluded, the union should be liable for any
intervening wage loss. 7'
In IBEW v. Foust,72 a majority of the Court held that punitive damages
may not be assessed against a union for breaching its duty of fair represen-
tation by failing to process a grievance. The Court reasoned that the federal
63. Id. at 558.
64. Id. at 572.
65. Id. at 569.
66. Id. at 570. The Court reached this conclusion even though the employer prevailed in
the arbitration proceeding after fairly presenting its case. Id. at 569.
67. Id. at 567.
68. Id. at 572.
69. Id. at 572-73.
70. Id. at 573.
71. Id.
72. 442 U.S. 42 (1979).
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labor policy disfavors punishment, and the adverse consequences of such
damage awards could be substantial. 3 In Foust, the union filed the discharged
employee's grievance two days after the time for submitting grievances had
expired. Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, first considered the
employee's argument that a strong remedy, such as punitive damages, "is
essential to encourage unfair representation suits and [therefore] inhibit union
misconduct."" The Court acknowledged that the threat of large punitive
sanctions would be a strong incentive to bring unfair representation actions
and would also affect the union's willingness to pursue individual
complaints." Nevertheless, the Court noted that such punitive measures
"could impair the financial stability of unions and unsettle the careful balance
of individual and collective interests which this Court has previously
articulated in the unfair representation area. '""
Moreover, Justice Marshall stated that the fundamental purpose of unfair
representation suits is to compensate employees for injuries caused by viola-
tion of their rights. The Foust Court cited Vaca for the proposition that
a union that fails to process a grievance cannot be held liable for damages
attributable to the employer's conduct. 8 The Foust majority, relying on the
Court's reasoning in Vaca, stated that because large damage awards could
impose a real hardship on the union, the union should not be required to
pay the employer's share of the employee's proven damages.79 Justice
Marshall stressed that this limitation on union liability was designed to pro-
vide individual employees with compensation for their injuries caused by the
union's misconduct, "without compromising the collective interests of union
members in protecting limited union funds." 8
The Foust Court further recognized that awarding punitive damages against
the union could adversely affect federal labor policy. First, large punitive
damage awards would risk the depletion of union treasuries and, thus, im-
pair the union's effectiveness as the collective bargaining representative.'
Ultimately, this risk would be borne by the individual employees because
their welfare in collective bargaining is directly related to the strength of
their union. The Court determined that this risk outweighed any benefit that
punitive dafnages may have as a deterrent to improper union conduct. 2
Second, the prospect of punitive sanctions would diminish the union's discre-
tion in administering the collective bargaining agreement. Since union discre-
tion is. necessary to promote the system of private dispute resolution, the
73. Id. at 52.
74. Id. at 48.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 48-49.
78. Id. at 49-50.
79. Id. at 50.
80. Id.
81..Id. at 50-51.
82. Id.
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threat of punitive damages is adverse to the private resolution of labor
disputes.83 Finally, the threat of punitive damages could have an impact on
the responsible decision making that is critical to peaceful labor relations.
The threat of a punitive damage award could cause the union to process
frivolous grievances or reject fair settlements. Accordingly, the Court main-
tained that the union's fear of such sanctions might prevent it from acting
in the clear interests of its members.8 4
B. United States Courts of Appeals Decisions
Thie Supreme Court, starting with Vaca, developed the general principles
governing the apportionment of liability for damages. The United States
courts of appeals have invariably applied these principles. Prior to Bowen,
the courts of appeals were not in conflict regarding the apportionment of
damages between the union and the employer. The circuits consistently
distinguished between two types of cases in assessing liability for damages. 5
First, the courts of appeals have continually held that when the union's breach
of its duty of fair representation consists solely in its failure to process an
employee's grievance properly, the employer remains totally liable for those
damages flowing directly from its breach of the collective bargaining agree-
ment that gave rise to the grievance.88 Accordingly, the employer is solely
liable for the employee's back pay, while the union is liable for the employee's
difficulty and expense in collecting from the employer.87 Thus, the courts
have routinely held that the union is liable only for the employee's attorney
fees and litigation expenses.88
In a second category of cases, where the union's breach of duty involves
participating in, or contributing to, the employer's breach of the collective
83. Id.
84. Id. at 51-52. Justice Blackmun, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist
and Stevens, wrote a concurring opinion in which he joined in the result only. Justice Blackmun
viewed the majority opinion as adopting "a per se rule that a union's breach of its duty of
fair representation can never render it liable for punitive damages." Id. at 52-53 (Blackmun,
J., concurring). Justice Blackmun stated that such a holding was unnecessary because the union's
conduct in this case was merely negligent, and therefore, it was clear that an award of punitive
damages was improper. Id. at 53 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun reasoned that
an award of punitive damages would serve to deter a union's egregious conduct in exceptional
cases, such as when the union's breach of duty involves intentional racial discrimination, deliberate
personal hostility, or willful infringement of first amendment freedoms. Id. at 60 (Blackmun,
J., concurring).
85. See Farmer v. Hotel Workers, Local 1064, 99 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2166, 2187 (E.D. Mich.
1978), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Farmer v. ARA Servs., Inc., 660 F.2d 1096 (6th
Cir. 1981).
86. Id.; Brief for Respondent Union at 15-16 n.17, Bowen v. United States Postal Serv.,
103 S. Ct. 588 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Bowen Union Brief].
87. See Seymour v. Olin Corp., 666 F.2d 202, 213-14 (5th Cir. 1982); Hardesty v. Essex
Group, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 752, 767 (N.D. Ind. 1982); Bowen Union Brief, supra note 86, at 15-16.
88. For a discussion of the awarding of attorney fees and litigation costs in § 301 suits,
see supra note 36.
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bargaining agreement, or engaging in arbitrary, discriminatory, or bad faith
conduct to harm the employee's interests, the union has been held liable
for the employee's lost earnings."9 The union may be held jointly or severally
liable with the employer,9" or liability may be apportioned to the extent that
each party shares responsibility for the employee's entire injury.' In these
cases, the union's misconduct may involve instigating or participating in the
grievant's discharge, preventing a willing employer from remedying the
wrongful discharge, precluding the grievant from any alternative remedy
against the employer, intentionally covering up exculpatory evidence or
preventing the employer from discovering the true facts of the matter, or
negotiating an arbitrary and discriminatory contract provision. 92
Illustrative of the first category of cases is the decision of the Fifth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals in Seymour v. Olin Corp.93 After being discharged
for theft, an employee informed his union and retained independent counsel.
The union, pursuant to a union rule, refused to process the employee's
grievance unless he dismissed his lawyer. The employee refused to terminate
his counsel and no grievance was filed with the employer.94 The employee
then sued his former employer for wrongful discharge and his union for
violating its duty of fair representation. In the district court, the employer
was held liable for all of the employee's back pay and the union was found
liable for the employee's attorney fees. 96 On appeal, the employer argued
that the trial court's division of damages was improper, asserting that it
was only responsible for the damages accruing "prior to the time an arbitrator
would have issued an award had the grievance process been followed." 97
According to the employer's assertion, the union should be held responsible
for any damages accruing after the hypothetical date on which the arbitra-
tion award would have been issued. The court of appeals rejected this argu-
ment and held that the district court properly apportioned the damages.9"
The Seymour court cited Vaca for the proposition that the employer, not
89. For recognition of this distinction, see Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 197 n.18 (1967);
Seymour v. Olin Corp., 666 F.2d 202, 215 n.14 (5th Cir. 1982); Peterson v. Rath Packing
Co., 461 F.2d 312, 316 (8th Cir. 1972); Richardson v. Communications Workers of Am., 443
F.2d 974, 981 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 818 (1981); Farmer v. Hotel Workers,
Local 1064, 99 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2166, 2187 (E.D. Mich. 1978), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
660 F.2d 1096 (6th Cir. 1981); Bowen Union Brief, supra note 86, at 14 n.16.
90. See Jones v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 495 F.2d 790, 798-99 (2d Cir. 1974).
91. See Lowe v. Pate Stevedoring Co., 558 F.2d 769, 770 (5th Cir. 1977); Peterson v. Rath
Packing Co., 461 F.2d 312, 316 (8th Cir. 1972).
92. See Seymour v. Olin Corp., 666 F.2d 202, 215 n.14 (5th Cir. 1982); Farmer v. Hotel
Workers, Local 1064, 99 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2166, 2187 (E.D. Mich. 1987), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, 660 F.2d 1096 (6th Cir. 1981); Bowen Union Brief, supra note 86, at 14-15 n.16.
93. 666 F.2d 202 (5th Cir. 1982).
94. Id. at 205-06.
95. Id. at 204.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 212.
98. Id.
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the union, is responsible for a wrongful discharge and the damages that subse-
quently accrue. 0 The court then applied the Supreme Court's analysis in
Czosek in determining the amount of loss of employment damages for which
the union may be held liable.' 0 The court reasoned that the award of attorney
fees and litigation costs against the union was "a fair measure of the dif-
ficulty and expense of collecting [from the employer]" and, thus, was
recoverable from the union.' 0' The court of appeals held that, on the basis
of Vaca and Czosek, the district court's apportionment of damages was cor-
rect because there was no evidence that the union participated in the
employer's discharge of the grievant."' 2 Nevertheless, the court emphasized
that its opinion, holding the employer solely liable for damages flowing
directly from its wrongful discharge, was limited to cases in which the union
did not engage in affirmative misconduct in breaching its duty of fair
representation. I03
The Seymour court stated that its analysis of the apportionment issue
reflected sound policy.'"" The court found no reason to relieve the employer
of the natural consequences flowing from its wrongful discharge simply
because the union breached a separate duty to the employee."' The Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit expressly recognized the need to accom-
modate the employee's interest in a proper remedy and the union's interest
in protecting its treasury on behalf of the collective interests of its members."'
Finally, the Seymour court reasoned that awards of attorney fees and court
costs, which may often be substantial, will provide the union with a proper
incentive to execute its responsibilities diligently." '
99. Id. at 213.
100. Id. at 213-14. For a discussion of Czosek, see supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
101. 666 F.2d at 213-14.
102. Id. at 214.
103. Id. at 215 n.14.
104. Id. at 215.
105. Id. at 214.
106. Id. at 215.
107. Id. There is another Fifth Circuit case that would seem to contradict the Seymour holding.
In Lowe v. Pate Stevedoring Co., 558 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1977), the plaintiff charged that
the employer unjustifiably discharged him and that the union breached its duty of fair represen-
tation in processing his grievance. The jury returned a guilty verdict against both the union
and the employer. The jury determined that the employee's damages were $25,000 and that
the union was responsible for 67% and the employer for 33% thereof. The trial court entered
a judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of the defendants. Id. at 770-71. The Fifth
Circuit reversed the district court but did not address the issue of apportionment. In light of
the court's failure to address the apportionment issue and the court's comprehensive analysis
of apportionment in Seymour, the Lowe decision does not reflect the Fifth Circuit's position
on the apportionment of damages.
The Fifth Circuit's analysis and holding in Seymour is supported by the decision of the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals in Holodnak v. Avco Corp., 514 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1975). The plain-
tiff in Holodnak was discharged and his subsequent grievance was arbitrated; the arbitration
award affirmed his dismissal. The plaintiff sued the union and the employer, seeking vacation
of the arbitration award, back pay, attorney fees, and reinstatement. The district court held
that the employee had not been adequately represented by the union's attorney at the arbitra-
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Another illustration of the first class of cases is the First Circuit's deci-
sion in De Arroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packinghouse. 'o8 The district
court found that the union had breached its duty of fair representation to
six of seven discharged employees by failing to process their grievances. °9
The court of appeals found that although the employees' claim against the
union was barred by the applicable statute of limitations, the employer could
still be liable for damages. ' The De Arroyo court refused to hold the union
accountable for lost wages when it did not participate in the employee's
wrongful discharge, and when there was no evidence that, but for the union's
conduct, the employee would have been reinstated or reimbursed at an earlier
date.''' In such situations, the court determined that the employer is liable
for the entire amount of the plaintiff-employee's lost earnings. The court
reasoned that the union cannot be said to have increased, or contributed
to, the employee's damages that were attributable to the employer's breach
of the collective bargaining agreement.' 2
tion hearing, because counsel acted in a perfunctory and arbitrary manner in preparing the
plaintiff's case. The court found that the plaintiff was entitled to back pay from the employer.
Citing Vaca, the court stated, "since essentially all the loss suffered here was due to [the
employer's] improper discharge of the plaintiff, it must be held liable for the plaintiff's back
pay and interest thereon." Holodnak, 381 F. Supp. 191, 205 (D. Conn. 1974). The district
court also found the employer liable for punitive damages, while the award of attorney fees
and expenses was apportioned between the employer and the union. The union was held liable
for one third of this award and the employer for two thirds. On appeal, the court of appeals
reversed the district court's award of punitive damages and affirmed the decision in all other
respects. Holodnak, 514 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1975).
108. 425 F.2d 281 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970).
109. Id. at 283.
110. Id. at 289.
Ill. Id. at 290.
112. Id. at 289-90. The First Circuit's position in De Arroyo was reaffirmed in Soto Segarra
v. Sea-Land Service, Inc., 581 F.2d 291 (Ist Cir. 1978). In Soto, the court expressly stated,
"where there is no allegation that the union participated in the improper discharge or evidence
that, but for the union's conduct, the employee would have been reinstated earlier, no part
of the back pay award is chargeable to the union." Id. at 298. The district court did not
hold the union liable for any of the back pay due the employee, but it did find the union
liable for the employee's attorney fees caused by the union's failure to process his grievance,
plus $30,000 for mental damages. The mental damages award was reversed, but the attorney
fees award was not appealed. Id. at 298-99.
The Fourth Circuit also refused to hold the union liable for an employee's lost wages caused
by an employer's wrongful discharge when the union did not participate in the employer's
breach of contract. In Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 642 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1981), rev'd,
103 S. Ct. 588 (1983), the Fourth Circuit stated that an employee's compensation is at all
times payable by his employer, and thus, reimbursement of the employee's lost earnings con-
tinues to be the exclusive obligation of the employer. 642 F.2d at 82. The Fourth Circuit's
position on apportionment of damages between the union and the employer is also presented
in Self v. Drivers, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers Local Union No. 61, 620 F.2d
439 (4th Cir. 1980), and Wyatt v. Interstate & Ocean Transp. Co., 623 F.2d 888 (4th Cir.
1980). In Self, the trial court held that the union breached its duty of fair representation by
failing to represent the discharged employees adequately in a contractual grievance procedure
and for participating in the wrongful discharge. The court of appeals reversed the damage
award. The court held that the union was not liable for the employees' lost wages where there
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The Sixth Circuit has adopted the same position regarding the union's
liability for back pay. In St. Clair v. Local 515, International Brotherhood
of Teamsters,' 3 the court of appeals set forth its interpretation of Vaca but
did not decide the apportionment issue. The court stated that "the Supreme
Court has strongly implied that in cases .. . involving a discharge and an
alleged failure by the union to take all available steps to remedy the
employee's complaint, the increment of damages caused by the union's breach
of duty is virtually de minimis......
In Milstead v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters,"5 the court clearly
established the Sixth Circuit's position on apportionment. In the first Milstead
case, the court of appeals vacated a damage award against the union because
it may have included some damages for lost wages." 6 On appeal following
remand, the court held that the district court acted properly in excluding
evidence of lost wages and fringe benefits against the union because the union
was not liable for lost wages. The court of appeals allowed the plaintiff
to introduce evidence of attorney fees, court costs, travel expenses, and other
costs related to the plaintiff's attempt to recover against the union.'' 7
was no evidence that (1) the "union caused the conduct for which the plaintiffs were discharged,"
or that (2) the plaintiffs' dismissals would not have been upheld even if the union had not
breached its duty. 620 F.2d at 443-44. The court held that the union was not liable for the
employees' losses arising from their discharge. The union was held responsible for the employees'
attorney fees and expenses incurred as a result of the union's failure to process their grievances
properly. Id. at 440. In Wyatt, the court held that the discharged employee's lost earnings
were caused by his discharge. Thus, these damages could not be recovered from the union
where the employee was foreclosed from recovery against the employer because of the dismissal
of the employee as a party-defendant. Wyatt, 623 F.2d at 892-93. In another case, Griffin
v. UAW, 469 F.2d 181 (4th Cir. 1972), the lower court awarded the plaintiff $12,000 in his
hybrid § 301 suit. After the employee was discharged for fighting with a supervisor, the union filed
a grievance with that supervisor. Finding that the union acted in an arbitrary manner, the
lower court held the union liable for breach of its duty of fair representation. The appellate
court affirmed the district court's judgment against the union without addressing the issue of
apportionment. Id.
113. 422 F.2d 128 (6th Cir. 1978).
114. Id. at 132.
115. 649 F.2d 395 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 896 (1982).
116. 580 F.2d 232, 236 (6th Cir. 1980).
117. 649 F.2d at 396. Pitts v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 700 F.2d 330 (6th Cir. 1982), strongly re-
affirms the Sixth Circuit's position. In Pitts, the union processed the discharged employee's
grievance through the preliminary stages of the grievance procedure but refused to arbitrate
the matter. Id. at 331. The district court entered judgment against the union and the employer
for back pay and attorney fees. Id. at 332. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the
union and the employer could not be held jointly and severably liable for the total award
of back pay, attorney fees and costs. Id. at 334-35. The Pitts court relied on the Vaca decision
for the rule that damages must be attributed to each defendant based on its respective fault.
Id. Thus, the district court in Pitts erred in holding both the employer arid the union jointly
liable for the whole of the damages, regardless of their relative fault. An opinion by a district
court within the Sixth Circuit, Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 96 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2837
(E.D. Mich. 1977), vacated on other grounds, 649 F.2d 1207 (6th Cir. 1981), has been cited
as authority for holding the union equally liable with the employer for back pay in hybrid
§ 301 cases. See Linsey, supra note 40, at 676-78; Martucci, supra note 40, at 105-06; Com-
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In the second category of cases, the courts of appeals have held unions
liable for back pay when the union has contributed to the employer's breach
of contract or engaged in affirmative misconduct to harm the employee's
interests.'' 8
This analysis was adopted in Richardson v. Communication Workers of
America."9 In Richardson, the employee sued his employer for wrongful
discharge and his union for breach of its duty of fair representation. Prior
to his discharge, the employee became concerned.about the use of union
funds and withdrew from union membership. Subsequent to his resignation
from the union, the employee was continually harassed and abused in and
out of the plant and was constantly a target of obscenities from officers,
stewards, and members of the union.' 0 The employee was discharged after
an altercation with another employee. At a subsequent meeting with the
employer, the union urged the grievant's discharge.' 2 ' The district court
entered judgment in favor of the grievant against his union and former
employer."' On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit held that a union may be held liable for an employee's loss of wages
when it participates in the employee's wrongful discharge. The court stated
that "[wihere the union's breach of duty involves only a failure to process
an employee's grievance, its apportioned damage arising from the unrelated
wrongful discharge is usually de minimis. [Under] such circumstances, the
employer is solely responsible for the damages flowing from the breach of
contract."' 3 The court continued, "Under the [principles of Vaca], where
the union also wrongfully induces the discharge, it follows that its liability
ment, Apportionment of Damages, supra note 34, at 169-70. In Ruzicka, the district court
found that the employer wrongfully discharged the employee and that the union breached its
duty of fair representation. 96 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2833. The court apportioned the award
of compensatory damages, including back pay, equally between the union and the employer.
Id. at 2837. This method of apportionment has never been adopted by the Sixth Circuit. See,
e.g., Pitts v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 700 F.2d 330, 334 n.4 (6th Cir. 1983) (expressly stating that the
district court's opinion in Ruzicka "conflicts with the law of this circuit").
118. For a district court decision holding the union liable for back pay damages because
of affirmative misconduct in breaching its duty of fair representation, see Freeman v. O'Neal
Steel, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 607 (N.D. Ala. 1977), rev'd, 609 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1980). in Freeman,
the district court held the union and the employer jointly and severally liable for all of the
employee's injuries, including back pay. 436 F. Supp. at 613. The court found the union and
the employer "equally culpable" in the wrongful acts directed against the employee. Id. The
court determined that the union's conduct in withdrawing the employee's discharge grievance
from the grievance committee was arbitrary and done in bad faith because the decision was
motivated by racial discrimination and personal hostility toward the employee. Id. at 611-12.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's finding of a breach of the
duty of fair representation. 609 F.2d at 1125. Accordingly, the court did not consider whether
the employer violated the collective bargaining agreement or the issue of the apportionment
of damages. Id. at 1128.
119. 443 F.2d 974, 976 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 818 (1971).
120. Id. at 977.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 976.
123. Id. at 981 (citations omitted).
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for damages may be apportioned to the extent that it is responsible for the
whole of such damage."'
24
In Harrison v. United Transportation Union,'23 the Fourth Circuit
addressed the apportionment issue in the context of a union's deliberate
misconduct in denying an employee any right of action against his employer.
After an employee was suspended from his position, he appealed to the com-
pany president, and the president upheld the suspension. The collective
bargaining agreement provided that an employee, or his representative, had
sixty days to file an appeal from the president's decision. In a meeting with
the employer, the union and the company agreed that another employee
would be reinstated provided that the plaintiff's grievance would not be pro-
cessed until it was too late to provide him with a right of action against
the employer. In violation of the union's constitution, the plaintiff was not
advised of the union's agreement to not process his grievance. Subsequent-
ly, the grievant's right to process his claim against the employer, either in-
dividually or through a union representative, lapsed under the Railway Labor
Act.' 6 The jury issued a verdict against the union, awarding the plaintiff
lost earnings and punitive damages.' 27
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
held that the union's "deliberately misleading conduct"' 28 justified holding
the union responsible for compensatory damages. Accordingly, the plaintiff
was entitled to recover, from the union, his loss of earnings during his
suspension.'29 The Harrison court reasoned that the union's breach of duty
extinguished the plaintiff's right to pursue his claim. Therefore, the union
was responsible to the grievant for the value of the right he lost because
of the union's deliberate misconduct.'
30
In Peterson v. Rath Packing Co.,13 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
concluded that a union may be held liable for back pay when it acts in
bad faith by adopting a discriminatory grievance policy. In Peterson, the
union adopted and adhered to an absolute policy of never transferring women
to a certain job classification, despite the fact that women employees had
the right under the collective bargaining agreement to be transferred to such
positions.'32 The plaintiffs in Peterson were denied transfers, and the union's
124. Id. at 982 (citations omitted).
125. 530 F.2d 558 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 958 (1976).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 559.
128. Id. at 563.
129. Id. at 562.
130. Id. at 562-63.
131. 461 F.2d 312 (8th Cir. 1972).
132. Id. The collective bargaining agreement included three job classifications: male jobs,
female jobs, and jobs that both sexes could hold. Id. at 314. The agreement further provided
that if a female was laid off, she could request any job held by a less senior employee, male
or female, provided that the employer determined she was able to perform the job adequately
like any other individual. Id. When the two plaintiffs were laid off, they sought employment
as a cook and a baker in the plant cafeteria. At that time, these positions were held by less
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policy prevented the grievants from having their grievances adequately pro-
cessed through the contractual procedure. The court viewed the union's
policy and conduct as a bad faith breach of the duty of fair representation
and wrongful participation in the employer's breach of the contract.' 3 3 The
court stated that "[a] good faith refusal of a union to process a grievance
is not a basis for union liability in a § 301(a) suit. . . .However, where
the union's refusal to represent its member results from its wrongful par-
ticipation in the breach of contract, then damages may be apportioned to
the union to the extent that it shares responsibility for the whole damage."'
3 4
Thus, the court of appeals affirmed the district court's judgment against
the union and the employer for loss of wages and vacation pay. 135
IV. THE BOWEN DECISION
A. The Facts
Charles Bowen was suspended without pay from his employment with the
United States Postal Service and eventually was formally terminated. The
reason for the discipline was his involvement in an altercation with a
co-employee. Bowen was a member of the American Postal Workers Union,
AFL-CIO, the recognized collective bargaining agent for Service employees.
Subsequent to his discharge, Bowen filed a grievance, but the union declined
to process his grievance through arbitration.' 36 Bowen thereafter sued the
senior male employees. Id. Both the union and the employer decided not to grant the plaintiffs
their requested positions without assessing the plaintiffs' individual capabilities. Id. at 315-16.
The court found this decision to be a breach of the collective bargaining agreement. Id.
133. Id. at 315-16.
134. Id. at 316 (citations omitted).
135. Id. at 314 n.l. For a similar decision in the Sixth Circuit, see Farmer v. ARA Servs.,
Inc., 660 F.2d 1096 (6th Cir. 1981). In Farmer, the union breached its duty of fair representa-
tion by (1) negotiating and entering into collective bargaining agreements, the provisions of
which were sexually discriminatory and not adequately or honestly explained to members prior
to ratification, and (2) capriciously failing or refusing to arbitrate the plaintiffs' grievances.
The court of appeals affirmed the district court's finding that the union could be held jointly
and severally liable with the company for the employees' damages when, as in the instant case,
the union's breach of duty resulted from its wrongful participation in the employer's breach
of contract or from the negotiation of discriminatory contractual provisions. Id. at 1107.
Atwood v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 432 F. Supp. 491 (D. Ore. 1977), aff'd, 657 F.2d 1055
(9th Cir. 1981), has been cited as support for the apportionment of lost earnings between the
union and the employer. See Comment, Apportionment of Damages, supra note 34, at 173
n.127. In fact, Atwood does not support the apportionment of back pay between the union
and the employer. The court did not apportion the damages at issue. The court cited Vaca
and Hines, and it stated that the issue of apportionment of damages would be before the court
or arbitrator if a breach of contract was found, and that the employer could then argue that
a part of the injured employee's damages was attributable to the union. Atwood, 432 F. Supp.
at 495-96. The court did not use the term "lost earnings," nor did it distinguish between the
various forms of damages, i.e., attorney fees, back pay, or litigation costs. The court merely
cited Vaca's governing principle in the course of denying the plaintiff's motion to dismiss the
union as a party. Id. at 496.
136. Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 103 S. Ct. 588, 590 (1983).
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employer for violating the collective bargaining agreement by dismissing him
without just cause, and the union for breaching its duty of fair
representation.' 37 Bowen sought damages and injunctive relief. The evidence
showed that the responsible union officials recommended pursuing the matter
through the grievance process, but for no apparent reason, the union's na-
tional office refused to take the matter to arbitration.
In the district court, the jury was instructed that the issue of apportioning
liability was primarily in its discretion. The court added, however, that the
jury could "equitably . . . base apportionment on the date of a hypothetical
arbitration decision-the date at which the [employer] would have reinstated
Bowen if the Union had fulfilled its duty."' 38 The court indicated that the
employer could be liable for damages prior to that date, and the union could
be liable for damages thereafter. The court found that the employer and
the union had engaged in illegal acts and, therefore, were liable to Bowen.
In determining that Bowen could not have independently proceeded with his
claim,'" the court found that if the grievance had been arbitrated, Bowen
would have been reinstated by August 1977, one year and five months after
his discharge.' 0 The jury held the union liable for $30,000 in compensatory
damages, in the form of lost benefits and wages, and the employer liable
for $22,954 of such damages. 141
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
reversed the damage award against the union. The court held that, as a matter
of law, "Bowen's compensation was at all times payable only by [his
employer and] reimbursement of . . . lost earning continued to be the
[employer's exclusive obligation]."' 4 2 Consequently, no portion of Bowen's
lost wages was chargeable to the union.' 43 This holding, however, was subse-
quently reversed by the Supreme Court.
B. The Majority Opinion
In Bowen, the Supreme Court held that when an employee has been
wrongfully discharged, the union may be held primarily liable for the
137. Bowen's suit was technically under § 1208(b) of the Postal Reorganization Act, 39 U.S.C.
§ 1208(b) (1976). Section 1208(b) is identical, in all relevant aspects, to § 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976). Bowen, 103 S. Ct. at 600 n.2 (White,
J., dissenting).
138. Bowen, 103 S. Ct. at 591.
139. Id. at 591-92.
140. Id. at 592 n.6.
141. Id. at 592. The jury also found the employer and the union liable for punitive damages
of $30,000 and $10,000 respectively. The district court determined that the Postal Service could
not be held liable for punitive damages because of the principle of sovereign immunity. The
court also set aside the punitive damage award against the union because it would not be fair
to hold the union liable when the employer was immune. Bowen did not appeal the court's
ruling on punitive damages. Id. at 591 n.4.
142. Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 642 F.2d 79, 82 (4th Cir. 1981), revd, 103 S.
Ct. 588 (1983).
143. Id.
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employee's increased damages caused by the union's breach of its duty of
fair representation. 44 The Court's holding was expressly directed toward situa-
tions in which the union did not participate in the employer's breach of
the collective bargaining agreement. 4 5 Justice Powell's majority opinion"4 6
interpreted Vaca and the federal labor policy as consistent with this holding. , 7
The Court noted that Vaca held that an employee's failure to exhaust
his contractual remedies would not bar his suit against the employer if the
union's breach of duty prevented him from exhausting such remedies.' 4
Stressing that the right of the individual employee to be made whole is para-
mount, the Court reasoned that the "fault that justifies dropping the bar
to [an] employee's suit for damages also requires the union to bear some
responsibility for increases in the employee's damages resulting from its
breach.' ' l 9 Finding that the union's breach of duty caused the grievance
procedure to malfunction, resulting in an increase in the employee's damages,
the Court held that the union was liable for this increase in damages.' 50
The Court also recognized that grievance procedures are fundamental to
federal labor policy. The Court noted that the union plays a pivotal role
in the grievance process because, as the exclusive representative, it has the
responsibility of determining whether to process a grievance.'5 ' The majority
reasoned that the union has a duty to the employees it represents and that
the employer may justifiably rely on the union's exercise of this duty.' 2
Justice Powell stated that if the employer could not rely on the union's deci-
sion, the grievance procedure "would not provide the uniform and exclusive
method for the orderly settlement of employee grievances which the Court
has recognized is essential to the national labor policy."'53 The Court feared
that incentives for the parties to comply with the contractual grievance pro-
cedure would be diminished if damages were not apportioned when each
party's default contributes to the employee's injury. The majority noted that
the employer may not be willing to agree to traditional arbitration clauses
if he is held totally responsible for the employee's damages.' 54
The Court believed that apportionment of damages would not impose an
undue burden on the union. The majority stated that apportionment would
act as an incentive for the union to pursue justifiable employee claims.'"
The Court considered this incentive to be consistent with the union's fair
144. 103.S. Ct. at 595.
145. Id. at 595 n.l.
146. Justice Powell's opinion was joined by Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Brennan,
Stevens, and O'Connor.
147. 103 S. Ct. at 595-98.
148. Id. at 595.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 596.
152. Id. at 597.
153. Id. (citing Clayton v. UAW, 451 U.S. 679, 686-87 (1981)).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 597-98.
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representation duty and its "commitment to the employer under the arbitra-
tion clause." 56 The majority concluded that Bowen's damages were initially
caused by the employer's unlawful discharge and increased by the union's
breach of its duty of fair representation. Therefore, the apportionment of
damages was required by Vaca, and the judgment of the court of appeals
was reversed and remanded."3 7
In a significant footnote,' the Court acknowledged that its opinion left
two issues unresolved. First, the Court did not decide whether the district
court's instructions on the apportionment of damages were proper. The union
had objected to the instructions only on the basis that no back pay could
be assessed against it; the union did not object to the manner of apportion-
ment. Secondly, the Court noted that it did not consider what, if any,
difference in degrees of fault existed between the union and the employer.' 9
C. The Dissenting Opinion-The Back Pay Issue
Justice White dissented from the Court's analysis of the union's liability
for back pay damages.' 60 He interpreted the majority opinion as holding
that an employer is only responsible for back pay that accrues prior to a
"hypothetical date upon which an arbitrator would have issued an award
had the union processed the grievance to arbitration."' 6 ' According to Justice
White's interpretation of the majority opinion, the union has the sole respon-
sibility for all back pay damages accruing after this hypothetical date, even
when it is not involved in the employer's decision to discharge the employee.' 62
Justice White argued that this result was not supported by judicial prece-
dent, equity, or national labor policy.'
6
156. Id. at 598.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 599 n.19.
159. Id.
160. Justice White concurred in part in the judgment and dissented in part. In regard to
the majority's opinion holding the union responsible for back pay damages, Justice White
dissented and his opinion was joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Rehnquist.
The district court awarded Bowen $52,954 for lost benefits and wages, with the union respon-
sible for $30,000 and the employer for $22,954. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that because the union was not liable for lost earnings, the district court erred in assessing
the $30,000 against it. However, the court did not increase the $22,974 award against the
employer. Thus, Bowen was left with an award of $22,954, although the district court awarded
him lost earnings and benefits of $52,954. The court justified this result because Bowen failed
to file a cross appeal against the employer. 642 F.2d 79, 82 n.6 (4th Cir. 1981). Justice White,
in Part IV of his opinion, which was joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun, disagreed
with the failure of the court of appeals to hold the employer entirely liable for the amount
the district court assessed against the union. Justice White would have affirmed the decision
of the court of appeals that the union was not liable for back pay, but reversed and remanded
the case with instructions to hold the employer liable for all of Bowen's lost earnings. 103
S. Ct. at 607.
161. 103 S. Ct. at 599 (White, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 605.
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In Justice White's dissent reviewing the apportionment precedent, the Vaca
and Hines decisions were cited for the principle that the union's breach of
duty merely removes the procedural exhaustion of remedies bar to a section
301 suit by an employee against his employer. Under this precedent, the
union's breach does not affect the employer's potential back pay liability
if the employee successfully proves the employer breached the collective
bargaining agreement. 6 '
Justice White relied on Vaca, Czosek, and Foust in developing the dis-
sent's view of the proper measure of a union's damages in a hybrid section
301 suit. He argued that the union is liable for damages to the extent that
its breach "adds to the difficulty and expense of collecting from the
employer."' 65
The dissent also argued that the majority's new rule would subject the
union to liability far greater than that to which the employer was subjected,
and that the rule did not relate this greater liability to the union's com-
parative fault. Moreover, the dissent asserted that the union will not have
any means to limit its constantly increasing liability.' 6 6 The dissent reasoned
that it was the employer who caused the employee's discharge, and therefore
only the employer could remedy this wrong by reinstating the employee. In
fact, the union never prevented the employer from reinstating Bowen; the
employer could have done so at any time.' 67 Justice White stated that
"[u]nder these circumstances, it is bizarre to hold . . . that the relatively
impotent union is exclusively liable for the bulk of the back pay."' 68
Furthermore, the dissent contended that neither the collective bargaining
agreement, nor the union's duty of fair representation, provided any sup-
port for the Court's holding that the union has a commitment to protect
the employer, and that the employer has a right to rely on the union as
a means of limiting its liability.' 9
In his dissent, Justice White further argued that the majority's rule will
have the practical effect of forcing unions to process many unmeritorious
grievances to arbitration in order to avoid potential liability for the increase
in the employee's damages. Justice White declared that this effect will im-
pair the ability of the contractual grievance procedure to provide an orderly
resolution of disputes.' 7 °
Finally, the dissent recognized two situations in which a union should bear
some responsibility for back pay. First, as the Vaca Court recognized, the
union and the employer may be jointly and severally liable when the union
has affirmatively induced the employer to breach the collective bargaining
164. Id. at 601.
165. Id. at 602 (quoting Czosek v. O'Mara, 397 U.S. 25, 29 (1970)).
166. Id. at 603.
167. Id. at 604.
168. Id. (emphasis in original).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 605.
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agreement. 7 ' Second, the union should be held secondarily liable when
it is not responsible for the initial discharge of an employee. This occurs
when the union's breach of duty prevents an employee from collecting the
back pay to which he is entitled from the employer, who is primarily liable
for these damages. In such cases, the employee should be entitled to collect
from the union." 2
V. ANALYSIS
A. Scope of the Bowen Holding
The Bowen majority held that a union may be found liable for an
employee's increased damages, in the form of lost wages, caused by the
union's breach of its duty of fair representation.' 3 The Court did not
establish a precise rule for apportioning damages between the union and
the employer. Justice White's dissent interpreted the Court's opinion as
holding that, in a typical wrongful discharge case, the employer will only
be responsible for back pay that accrues prior to the hypothetical date on
which an arbitration award would have issued if the union had processed
the grievance to arbitration. The union will be responsible for back pay
damages that accrue after the hypothetical arbitration date."' Justice White's
interpretation of the majority opinion is correct regarding its application to
the facts presented. Nonetheless, the Bowen Court expressly refused to decide
whether the apportionment rule applied by the district court was proper. '
The Court also declined to address the issue of whether the parties' relative
fault is a proper consideration in apportioning damages.
In light of Bowen's limited holding and its lack of guidance regarding
apportionment, lower courts are implicitly assigned the task of developing
a rule of apportionment. The Court's limited holding may be interpreted
to support three different apportionment rules. First, the union may be held
responsible for back pay that accrues after a hypothetical date upon which
an arbitration award would have issued had the union processed the grievance
through arbitration. This rule was applied by the district court in Bowen." 6
Second, the employer and the union could be held liable on the basis of
their relative degrees of fault. After establishing the employer's and the union's
relative faults, the principle of comparative fault could then be employed
to apportion damages among the employer and the union in section 301
suits."' Under comparative fault principles, the union and the employer would
171. Id.
172. Id. at 605-06.
173. B. FELDACKFR, supra note 1, at 389.
174. Bowen, 103 S. Ct. at 599 (White, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
175. Id. at 599 n.19; see VanderVelde, supra note 1, at 1161 n.232.
176. 103 S. Ct. at 591.
177. Comparative negligence is a fault concept that apportions liability according to the extent
that each party's conduct contributed to the damages incurred. Four types of comparative
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be held liable for the portion of the employee's damages that equals its
percentage of fault in causing the employee's injury.'78 Finally, a third rule
could be that the union is liable for the increase in the employee's damages
from the point at which the employee first contacted the union regarding
his grievance, if the union's conduct at or near that point constituted a breach
of its duty. This approach is arguably supported by the Bowen majority's
focus on holding the union responsible for that portion of the employee's
damages which was "increased by the Union's breach of its duty of fair
representation."' 9 While this formula would impose a greater share of lia-
bility on the union than it was forced to bear in Bowen, the Court's holding
does not prohibit such a division of liability.
The Court established a procedure for the union to diminish its share of
negligence systems are presently in effect: pure comparative negligence, two modified theories,
and the slight-gross theory. The primary difference between these systems lies in the point at
which contributory negligence ceases to reduce the plaintiff's recovery and serves to bar recovery
completely.
The pure comparative negligence system is the easiest method of allocating damages. Under
this system, the plaintiff recovers damages up to the point at which the plaintiff's negligence
was the sole cause of her damage. For example, a plaintiff who is 99% at fault can recover
from a defendant who is 1076 causally negligent. The plaintiff's recovery is merely reduced in
proportion to the extent that she is deemed to be contributorily at fault.
Two modified systems of comparative negligence have developed. The first applies the "not
as great as" rule while the second applies the "not greater than" rule. A plaintiff may recover
under the former rule, sometimes called the 4907o system, if her negligence is less than the negligence
of the defendant. As with pure comparative negligence, the plaintiff's recovery is reduced in
proportion to the percentage of her fault in contributing to damages. When the plaintiff's
negligence is equal to or greater than the defendant's negligence, however, the plaintiff is barred
from any recovery.
Under the "not greater than" rule, or the 50076 system, a plaintiff can recover damages if
his negligence is less than or equal' to that of the defendant. In contrast to the "not as great
as" rule, the plaintiff not only recovers when his negligence is less than the defendant's, but
also when each party's negligence is determined to be equal. Although this differs from the
"not as great as" rule by only one percent, the difference is crucial because it is common
for juries in close two-party cases to apportion fault equally.
A plaintiff may recover reduced damages under the "slight versus gross" system only when
the defendant's negligence is gross and the plaintiff's negligence is slight in comparison. When
this determination of negligence is made, the plaintiff's recovery is reduced by an amount pro-
portional to her causal contribution. However, when this wide disparity between the fault of
each party is not found, the plaintiff is barred from recovery.
In the context of a § 301 action, the principle of comparative fault was used to apportion
damages in Lowe v. Pate Stevedoring Co., 558 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1977). The plaintiff in Lowe
brought an action against his employer and the union, alleging wrongful discharge and breach
of the duty of fair representation because the union refused to investigate the plaintiff's ter-
mination. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and against the union and the
employer. The jury found that the employee's total damages were $25,500 and that the employer
was responsible for 3307o f the damages, while the union was liable for the remainder. Id. at 770.
178. See B. FELDACKER, supra note I, at 280-81. See generally Comment, Apportionment
of Damages, supra note 34, at 156 (lost earnings damages should be apportioned between the
union and the employer by a method approximating the results of a "properly functioning"
grievance procedure).
179. Bowen, 103 S. Ct. at 599.
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liability. The Court noted that the union has the option, at the point when
it realizes it may have breached its duty, to bring its possible default to
the employer's attention.' 0 According to the Court, a jury can take such
union conduct into account when apportioning the parties' liability for
damages.'"' The majority noted this possible union tactic in response to
Justice White's dissent. Justice White argued that because only the employer,
not the union, could act to prevent continuing increasing liability, the union
should not be held responsible for the employee's back pay accruing past
the hypothetical arbitration date.' 82
The majority raised three objections to Justice White's argument. First,
the dissent's position would leave the employer with the "dubious option"' 83
of "either reinstat[ing the employee promptly or leav[ing] itself exposed to
open-ended liability" for back pay." 4 The Court viewed such an option as
defeating the purpose of the grievance procedure, which is to provide the
exclusive means of resolving this type of dispute." 5 Secondly, the Court stated
that an employer has no way of knowing that a union's failure to process
a grievance through arbitration constitutes a breach of its duty of fair
representation.' 86 Finally, the majority feared that the dissent's position would
allow the union and the employee, after a case reached the trial stage, to
agree to a settlement in which the union would acknowledge its breach of
duty in exchange for the employee's willingness to look to the employer for
his entire recovery. The Court viewed this possibility as creating an improper
incentive for the union and its member to agree to such a settlement. 87
Contrary to 'the arguments raised by the dissent, the Court's holding in
Bowen does not absolve the employer of liability for its breach of the col-
lective bargaining agreement. The employer is still liable for that portion
of damages resulting from its breach of the contract. "8 Moreover, the
majority noted that the employer remains secondarily liable for the full
amount of the employee's lost wages.' 9 Bowen permits the union to be held
primarily responsible for that portion of damages resulting from the breach
of its duty of fair representation. Yet, if the successful plaintiff-employee
is unable to collect the damages due from the union, the employer remains
secondarily liable for the entire amount of the employee's lost wages.' 90
180. Id. at 597 n.15.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 603-04 (White, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). Justice White reasoned
that only the employer had the continuing ability to remedy a wrongful discharge by reinstating
the employee. Id. at 604.
183. Id. at 597 n.15.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 595.
189. Id. at 595 n.12.
190. Id. o
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B. Bowen's Relationship to Prior Precedent
Ironically, Justice Powell, writing for the majority in Bowen, frequently
cited Vaca as support for a rule holding the union liable for a portion of
the employee's lost wages when the union did not participate in the employer's
breach of contract or engage in affirmative misconduct. 9 ' The Vaca deci-
sion, however, and other Supreme Court precedent do not support the Court's
holding in Bowen.
Prior to Bowen, the Supreme Court issued four major decisions address-
ing the question of liability for damages in suits against a union for breach
of its duty of fair representation, and an employer for breach of a collective
bargaining agreement. 92 These cases were Vaca, Czosek, Hines, and Foust.
The apportionment issue was directly addressed in Vaca and Czosek. Vaca
established the governing principle for apportioning liability. In Czosek, the
Court expressly adopted and clarified Vaca's governing principle.' 93 The
Czosek Court held that "damages against the union . . . are unrecoverable
except to the extent that refusal to handle the grievances added to the dif-
ficulty and expense of collecting from the employer."' 9' Although Hines and
Foust did not directly address the issue of apportionment, Vaca was cited
approvingly in each case and the governing principle was not modified.
In Hines, Justice Stewart filed a two paragraph concurring opinion in which
he argued that the employer should not be held liable for an employee's
lost wages that accrued from the time of a tainted arbitration determination
until the time of a subsequent valid determination that the discharge was
wrongful.'9 5 Justice Stewart contended that if an employer relies, in good
faith, on a favorable arbitration award, his failure to reinstate the discharged
employee is proper until there is a contrary decision.' 96 This opinion is in-
adequate support for the majority's position in Bowen. First, Justice Stewart's
opinion was not joined by any other member of the Court.' Four Justices,
other than Stewart, joined Justice White's majority opinion in Hines.'99 Con-
sequently, the majority did not need Stewart's vote.' 99 If the majority had
been willing to accept Stewart's position, there would have been no need
191. Id. at 593-99 (1983).
192. For a development of pre-Bowen Supreme Court precedent regarding apportionment,
see supra notes 41-84 and accompanying text.
193. See Note, A Proposal for Apportioning Damages, supra note 40, at 502-03.
194. Czosek v. O'Mara, 397 U.S. 25, 29 (1970).
195. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, 424 U.S. 554, 572-73 (1976). For an analysis of the
shortcomings of Justice Stewart's opinion, see Bowen, 103 S. Ct. at 601 n.3 (White, J., dis-
senting in part and concurring in part); Note, A Proposal for Apportioning Damages, supra
note 40, at 506-09.
196. Hines, 424 U.S. at 573 (Stewart, J., concurring).
197. Bowen, 103 S. Ct. at 601 n.3 (White, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
198. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Justices Brennan, Stewart,
Marshall, and Blackmun. Justice Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion joined by Chief Justice
Burger. Justice Stevens took no part in the case.
199. Note, A Proposal for Apportioning Damages, supra note 40, at 509.
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for him to concur.2"' Secondly, Justice Stewart's concurrence in Hines was
based on an employer's good faith reliance on an actual favorable arbitra-
tion decision.2" ' Bowen greatly exceeds the scope of this concurring opinion
because it grants the employer the right to rely on a nonexistent arbitration
proceeding." 2 In addition, Bowen's failure to adopt a clear rule of appor-
tionment allows rower courts to develop a rule which could impose liability
on the union at an earlier point than the date of an actual arbitration award,
the date that Justice Stewart argued was proper for determining the union's
liability for back pay damages.20 3
Justice White wrote the Court's opinions in Vaca, Czosek, and Hines,
the most significant decisions regarding the apportionment issue. In Bowen,
Justice White wrote a compelling dissent ' in which he contended that the
Court's decision was contradictory to "[pirecedent, equity, and [the] national
labor policy." 2 5 In light of Justice White's previous opinions and his dis-
sent in Bowen, the Court's holding in Bowen is a significant departure from
the apportionment principles developed in Vaca, Czosek, and Hines.
In this departure from prior precedent, the Court effectively imposed a
substantive duty on the union that was not included in the collective bargain-
ing agreement. The Bowen majority concluded that the employer had a right
to rely on the union's decision not to pursue an employee's grievance.20 6
This right of reliance thus enables the employer to diminish its exposure
in the event that an employee sues it for breaching the collective bargaining
agreement. Accordingly, the Court effectively imposed a duty upon the union
to indemnify the employer for its breach of the contract, even though such
an obligation was not included in the collective bargaining agreement as a
product of arm's-length negotiations.0 7 The employer should be forced to
200. Id.
201. Bowen, 103 S. Ct. at 601 n.3 (White, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
202. Id.
203. Battle v. Clark Equipment Co., 579 F.2d 1338 (7th Cir. 1978), has been cited as sup-
port for the position adopted by former Justice Stewart in his concurring opinion in Hines.
See Comment, Apportionment of Damages, supra note 34, at 172-73. In Battle, the court found
that the union did not breach its duty of fair representation but, it did not apportion damages
between the union and employer. Although the court in Battle cited Justice Stewart's opin-
ion in Hines, Battle does not stand for the adoption of Justice Stewart's approach because,
unlike Hines, there was no wrongful conduct by the union or the employer and there was
no occasion to apportion liability.
In Chambers v. Local Union No. 639, 578 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1978), a case involving a
seniority dispute following a merger of two plants, the court did not follow Justice Stewart's
position. The Chambers court stated:
When the employer relies on the advice and interpretation of a labor union to the
detriment of an employee, it does so at its own risk, subject to an alportionment
of any liability between itself and the Union. This liability runs even to instances
where the employer has been entirely sustained in a grievance-arbitration hearing.
Id. at 380 (footnote and citations omitted).
204. 103 S. Ct. at 599-607.
205. Id. at 605.
206. Id. at 596-97.
207. See id. at 604-605 (White, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
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bargain for the protection provided by such a broad indemnity clause.2"'
Bowen's analysis is clearly contradictory to the established principle that
courts may not impose, upon either the employer or the union, requirements
to which they have not previously agreed in the collective bargaining
agreement.
This principle was clearly articulated by the Court in Carbon Fuel Co.
v. United Mine Workers of America"' and United Mine Workers of America,
Health and Retirement Funds v. Robinson.2 In Carbon Fuel, the Court
stated that Congress, in the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act, sought to promote the
policy of free collective bargaining. Accordingly, Congress clearly intended
to "leave the parties entirely free of any Government compulsion to agree
to a proposal, or even reach an agreement. ... "' This intent was ex-
pressed in section 8(d) of the NLRA, which provides that the obligation
to collectively bargain "does not compel either party to agree to a proposal
or require the making of a concession." 2
In Robinson, the Court followed Carbon Fuel and held that "when neither
the collective-bargaining process nor its end product violates any command
of Congress, a federal court has no authority to modify the substantive terms
of a collective-bargaining contract." 2 3 In light of the principles articulated
in Carbon Fuel and Robinson, the Bowen majority's imposition of a substan-
tive collective bargaining provision, in the form of the implied duty of the
union to indemnify the employer, is contrary both to principles previously
established by the Supreme Court and to the national labor policy favoring
free collective bargaining.
The Bowen Court's analysis is also inconsistent with the union's financial
and institutional interests. In Bowen, the Court reasoned that a rule requir-
ing the union to pay damages will provide an additional incentive for the
union to execute its duty of fair representation properly." ' The majority
viewed this rule as consistent with the interests recognized in Foust,2"5
although the Foust Court held that labor unions could not be held liable
for punitive damages.2"6 Bowen distinguished the impact of compensatory
damages from that of punitive damages by stating:
[In Foust,] [t]he interest in deterring future damages by the union was
outweighed by the debilitating impact that "unpredictable and potentially
substantial" awards of punitive damages would have on the union's exer-
cise of discretion in deciding what claims to pursue. An award of com-
208. Id.; Edwards, Employers' Liability for Union Unfair Representation: Fiduciary Duty
or Bargaining Reality?, 27 LAB. L.J. 686, 691-92 (1976).
209. 444 U.S. 212 (1979).
210. 455 U.S. 562 (1982).
211. 444 U.S. at 218-19.
212. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976).
213. 455 U.S. at 576.
214. Bowen, 103 S. Ct. at 597-98.
215. IBEW v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42 (1979).
216. Id. at 52. The Bowen Court reiterated this holding. 103 S. Ct. at 597 n.16.
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pensatory damages .. .normally will be limited and finite. Moreover,
the union's exercise of discretion is shielded by the standard necessary to
prove a breach of the duty of fair representation. Thus, the threat that
was present in Foust is absent here.2 7
This distinction drawn in Bowen, however, is not supported by the Court's
decisions in Vaca and Foust, which were premised on the recognition that
union responsibility for damage awards, either punitive or compensatory,
can seriously undermine a union's role as exclusive bargaining representative
by draining its financial resources.
In holding that the union should not be liable for the compensatory
damages attributable to the employer's breach of contract, the Vaca Court
stated that "[iut could be a real hardship on the union to pay these damages,
even if the union were given a right of indemnification against the
employer." 2 8 Additionally, Foust recognized that the debilitating impact of
punitive damages on the union treasury outweighed the interest in deterring
future misconduct by the union.2 9 The Bowen majority, however, did not
acknowledge Vaca's recognition of the union's financial interest in the con-
text of compensatory damages. The Bowen court merely attempted to
distinguish Foust on the basis that compensatory damages are "normally
limited and finite." 2 ' The fallacy of the Court's distinction is that while
an employee's lost wages may be calculated in a reasonably accurate manner,
the union's share of liability is uncertain and potentially debilitating after
Bowen. Under Bowen, it is unclear whether liability will be determined on
the basis of the hypothetical date on which an arbitration award would have
issued if the union had processed the grievance to arbitration, or on the
basis of some other concept of relative fault. In either situation, Bowen's
limited holding makes the specific nature of the adopted rule unclear and
creates the potential for unforeseeably large damage awards that threaten
the union's interest in a stable treasury-consequences that the Court sought
to avoid in Vaca and Foust.
A rule requiring the union to pay for the employee's increased damages
may substantially injure its resources. Moreover, it is unnecessary to pro-
vide an incentive for the proper handling of grievances or to deter union
misconduct. In Republic Steel v. Maddox,2"' the Court recognized the union's
institutional interest in grievance administration. The Maddox Court stated
that the "[u]nion interest in prosecuting employee grievances is clear. Such
activity complements the union's station as exclusive bargaining represen-
tative by permitting it to participate actively in the continuing administra-
tion of the contract. In addition, conscientious handling of grievance claims
will enhance the union's prestige with employees." '2 22 The union, therefore,
217. 103 S. Ct. at 597-98 n.16 (citations omitted).
218. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 197.
219. IBEW v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 50-52 (1979).
220. Bowen, 103 S. Ct. at 597-98 n.16.
221. 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
222. Id. at 653.
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has an incentive to handle grievances effectively because this will serve its
interests as the exclusive bargaining representative. Moreover, the political
and personal interests of elected local union officials in preserving their status
provides these individuals with an incentive to ensure that its constituency
(the employees) view the union as a valuable representative. These tangible
and immediate interests provide for the union and its officials a greater in-
centive to represent its bargaining unit members fairly and vigorously than
would the potential of a large damage award.
The realities of fair representation litigation also provide effective
safeguards against union misconduct.223 The threat of being forced to bear
the costs of the employee's attorney fees and litigation expenses, disregard-
ing any potential back pay award, is a real and significant deterrent to the
union's breach of its duty of fair representation. The decision of the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Seymour v. Olin Corp.22" illustrates this
point.22 In Seymour, the court held that the union was not liable for any
of the employee's lost wages.226 The union, however, did not escape finan-
cial responsibility for its breach of duty. The court held the union solely
liable for the employee's attorney fees, an amount in excess of $39,000.227
Prior to Bowen, therefore, unions already had a significant financial incen-
tive to process grievances fairly.
The Bowen Court's analysis is also inconsistent with Vaca's concept of
fault in apportioning damages. Vaca established that apportionment of
liability should be according to the damage caused by the fault of the union
and the employer. 2" The Vaca Court stated that the employer should not
be shielded from the natural consequences of his breach of contract by the
union's breach of its duty. '29 Accordingly, the Court held that an award
against a union should not include damages attributable solely to the
employer's breach of the collective bargaining agreement. 3 ' In Bowen, the
Court viewed its analysis of the concept of fault as consistent with Vaca.
The Bowen majority acknowledged that the employer wrongfully discharged
the employee and was liable for back pay. Nevertheless, the Court reasoned
that the union's breach of duty caused the grievance procedure to malfunc-
tion, and this caused an increase in the employee's damages. Bowen held
that the union was solely liable for this increase in damages, even though
both the union and the employer caused the employee's damages.'
223. See generally, Note, A Proposal for Apportioning Damages, supra note 40, at 508.
224. 666 F.2d 202 (5th Cir. 1982).
225. See id. at 215; see also Del Casal v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 634 F.2d 295 (5th Cir.
1981) (union held liable for $35,000 for services of an employee's attorney in a duty of fair
representation action); Scott v. Teamster Local 377, 548 F.2d 1244 (6th Cir. 1977) (court held
union liable for miscellaneous expenses incurred by the employee in collecting from the employer);
Bowen Union Brief, supra note 86, at 13 nn.14-15.
226. Seymour, 666 F.2d at 212-15.
227. Id. at 215-16.
228. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 197.
229. Id. at 186.
230. Id. at 197.
231. Bowen, 103 S. Ct. at 595.
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It is unfair and illogical to hold the union responsible for an employee's
loss of earnings for the period of time after a hypothetical arbitration date
on the ground that the union's conduct increased the employee's damages.
First, the employer was solely responsible for wrongfully discharging the
employee. If the employee had not been discharged, he would have remained
working and not suffered any lost wages. Therefore, but for the employer's
wrongful discharge, there would be no need for anyone to reimburse the
employee for damages accumulated before or after a hypothetical arbitra-
tion date. 32 Second, the union did not cause the employer to breach the
collective bargaining agreement. The union did not demand that the employee
be discharged nor provoke the employer to breach the contract. 33 Moreover,
the employer had the sole power to reinstate the employee and remedy the
breach of contract;2 34 the union did not prevent the employee's
reinstatement.2 35
The weakness of this aspect of the Bowen analysis was expressly addressed
in Seymour v. Olin Corp."' The Seymour court refused to hold the union
liable for an employee's back pay damages that accrued after a hypothetical
arbitration date. The court reasoned that the employer should be responsi-
ble for the back pay as a natural consequence of its wrongful discharge and
should not be relieved of this liability merely because the union breached
a separate duty to the employee to promptly rectify the employer's breach
of contract.237 The Seymour court explained, "The weakness of [the
employer's] position is revealed when it is expressed somewhat more stark-
ly: [employer], the wrongdoer, protests to the Union: you should be liable
for all damages flowing from my wrong from and after a certain time,
because you should have caught and rectified my wrong by that time." '238
Under this reasoning, the Bowen Court's position incorrectly allows a union
to be held liable for the wrongful conduct of the employer.
Finally, Bowen allows the union to be held liable for a far greater share
of damages than the employer. 39 The hypothetical arbitration date, which
serves to limit the employer's apportioned liability, will usually be less than
one year after the employee's discharge.24 The majority of recent hybrid
section 301 cases, however, have taken over five years to be fully litigated.
2
'
In light of these time patterns, the union's share of liability, which under
Bowen may cover the portion of lost wages accruing after a hypothetical
arbitration date, could cover a span of three to four years. Yet, in such
232. Id. at 603 (White, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part); Bowen Union Brief,
supra note 86, at 38.
233. Bowen Union Brief, supra note 86, at 14.
234. Id. at 16 and 39.
235. Id. at 14; Bowen, 103 S. Ct. at 604 (White, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
236. 666 F.2d 202 (5th Cir. 1982).
237. Id. at 214-15,
238. Id. at 215.
239. Bowen, 103 S. Ct. at 603 (White, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
240. Id.
241. Id.
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cases, the employer's liability for back pay will only cover a period of nearly
a year. This great disparity in liability is totally unrelated to the parties'
relative fault in causing the employee's injuries. 2 ' The result is that the union,
which has had nothing to do with the wrongful discharge of an employee,
will pay three to four times as much in back pay damages as will the
employer, who actually discharged the employee.
C. Bowen's Impact on the Collective Bargaining Relationship
1. Statute of Limitations
Subsequent to Bowen in Del Costello v. Teamsters,"3 the Supreme Court
addressed the issue of what statute of limitations applies in an employee
suit against an employer and a union, alleging the employer's breach of a
collective bargaining agreement and the union's breach of its duty of fair
representation by mishandling the grievance or arbitration proceedings. The
Court held that section 10(b) of the NLRA is the proper statute of limita-
tions governing these hybrid section 301 suits against both the employer and
the union.4 ' Section 10(b) provides a six-month period for presenting unfair
labor practice charges to the NLRB.4 5 Del Costello implicitly applies to cases
in which the employee's grievance was processed through the arbitration pro-
ceeding, and cases in which the grievance was not taken to arbitration or
even through the preliminary stages of the grievance procedure."4 6
The Del Costello Court reasoned that an individual employee is often un-
sophisticated in labor relations and will usually be represented by a union.
Within the applicable statute of limitations, however, the employee must
evaluate the quality of her union's representation, retain an attorney, in-
vestigate matters not in issue in the arbitration proceeding, and develop her
lawsuit. State statutes for vacating arbitration awards typically provide a
very short time, such as thirty days,"" in which to sue to vacate an arbitra-
tion award. The Court, therefore, concluded that "state limitations periods
for vacating arbitration awards fail to provide an aggrieved employee with
a satisfactory opportunity to vindicate his rights under § 301 and the fair
representation doctrine. '"248
In Del Costello, the Court had its first opportunity to interpret Bowen.
242. Id.
243. 103 S. Ct. 2281 (1983).
244. Id. at 2291.
245. Section 10(b) provides, in relevant part, "That no complaint shall issue based upon
any unfair labor practice occurring more than six months prior to the filing of the change
with the Board .. " 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1979).
246. 103 S. Ct. at 2291 n.16.
247. In United Parcel Serv. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56 (1981), however, the New York State
statute of limitations for vacating an arbitration award was 90 days. This short period in which
to file suit severely restricts a grievant's ability to seek redress under state law. In the prescrib-
ed time, an aggrieved employee must discover misconduct on the part of the union, retain
an attorney, and develop his case for trial.
248. Del Costello, 103 S. Ct. at 2291.
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Justice Brennan, writing for a majority, revealed that Bowen was neither
intended to alter the apportionment principles established in Vaca and Czosek,
nor to expand the scope of the union's liability for damages in the form
of lost wages. In holding that the application of a state statute of limita-
tions for legal malpractice to an employee's claim against the union was
inappropriate, the majority opinion declared:
The most serious objection [to applying the state's statute of limitations
period] is that it does not solve the problem caused by the too-short time
in which an employee could sue his employer under borrowed state law.
In a commercial setting, a party who sued his lawyer for bungling an
arbitration could ordinarily recover his entire damages, even if the statute
of limitations foreclosed any recovery against the opposing party to the
arbitration. The same is not true in the § 301/fair representation setting,
however. We held in Vaca, and reaffirmed ...in Bowen, that the union
may be held liable only for "increases if any in [the employee's] damages
caused by the union's refusal to process the grievance." Thus, if we apply
state limitations periods, a large part of the damages will remain uncollec-
tible in almost every case unless the employee sues within the time allotted
for his suit against the employer.2"9
The Court did not apply its interpretation of Bowen to the facts presented
in Del Costello. Thus, it is unclear whether the Court views Bowen as proper
authority for a new rule of apportioning damages, such as a rule holding
the employer liable for an employee's damages up to the hypothetical date
of an arbitration award and holding the union responsible for damages from
such a date until the time of the employee's reinstatement. Nevertheless,
it is clear that the Court views Bowen as consistent with Vaca and Czosek
in the following respects. First, the Court indicated that the employee can-
not recover his entire damages from the union.25 A verdict holding the union
entirely responsible for the employee's damages was conceivable, although
unlikely, if Bowen was interpreted to allow a jury to apportion the liability
for damages purely on the basis of each party's degree of fault. Secondly,
the Court's interpretation of Bowen will not allow the employer to com-
pletely hide behind the union's breach of duty. In Del Costello, the Court
emphasized that "the union may be held liable only for increases if any
in [the employee's] damages caused by the union's" breach of duty.25 ' The
Court added that "a large part of the [employee's] damages will remain
uncollectible in almost every case unless the employee sues within the time
allotted for his suit against the employer." 2"2 Thus, Del Costello clearly in-
dicated that the Court recognizes a limit to the union's liability and the scope
of the Bowen decision. 253
249. Id. at 2292 (citations and footnote omitted) (emphasis and brackets in original).
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. The United States circuit courts of appeals are divided on the issue of the retroactive
application of the six-month limitations period mandated by Del Costlo. The Third, Fifth,
Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have held that the six-month limitations period should
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2. Union's Response
Although Del Costello indicated that Bowen may not radically increase
the union's exposure to liability for damages, the scope of the Bowen deci-
sion remains unclear. Del Costello neither addressed, nor defined, the proper
application of the majority opinion in Bowen regarding the apportionment
issue. Therefore, labor unions and their counsel must consider how they are
going to alter their policies and procedures to respond to the uncertainty
presented by Bowen.
a. Role of the Grievance Procedure
The most important feature of a collective bargaining agreement is the
grievance procedure.25 The grievance/arbitration procedure involves the ad-
judication and enforcement of rights under an existing collective bargaining
agreement.2 " This procedure provides employees with a contractual remedy
for the employer's breach of the collective bargaining agreement.256
be applied retroactively to bar § 301 suits against employers and unions that were filed more
than six months after the claim arose. See Perez v. Dana Corp., Parish Frame Div., 718 F.2d
581 (3d Cir. 1983); Edwards v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 1983 D. LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 245,
D-1, No-81-2283 (5th Cir. Dec. 5, 1983); Curtis v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local
299, 716 F.2d 360 (6th Cir. 1983); Storck v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local Union
No. 600, 712 F. 2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1983); Hand v. International Chemical Workers Union,
712 F.2d 1350 (lth Cir. 1983); Rogers v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 1983 D. LAB. REP. (BNA)
No. 245, A-2, Nos. 81-7810, 82-8137, 82-3005, 82-5625, 82-5115, 82-5194, 82-5313, 82-5589
(1lth Cir. Dec. 5, 1983). The Ninth Circuit has held that the Del Costello decision should
not be applied retroactively. See Edwards v. Teamsters Local Union No. 36, 1983 D. LAB.
REP. (BNA) No. 245, E-I, No. 82-5326 (9th Cir. Nov. 3, 1983); see also 1983 D. LAB. REP.
(BNA) No. 245, A-1.
254. Feller, supra note 14, at 742. The grievance procedure varies greatly, usually depending
upon the size of a company. Small companies may have a simple, informal one- or two-step
procedure. Major companies, however, often have very complex and formal grievance pro-
cedures. These grievance procedures usually contain four basic steps. First, the individual union
member reports his problem either orally or in writing to the foreman or union steward in
the complainant's department. If the matter is not settled at this stage, it will be referred to
higher officers of the union and the company for an informal hearing. At the third stage,
the grievance is heard before a meeting of the management grievance committee and the union
shop committee. Finally, if the dispute remains unsettled, the grievance will proceed to arbitration.
At arbitration, the dispute is submitted to either a single arbitrator or a panel of arbitrators.
One of arbitration's chief advantages is that it is adaptable to the needs of the parties and
may vary greatly in its structure. Arbitration may range from an informal presentation and
discussion of the dispute to a proceeding that closely resembles a formal trial. The arbitrator
may make no formal record of the proceeding or the decision, or the hearing may be fully
recorded and transcribed by a court reporter and a formal written opinion issued.
This flexibility is beneficial to meeting the needs of labor and management in a wide variety
of contexts. Moreover, arbitration utilizes experts whose experience and familiarity with labor-
management relations enable them to understand and satisfactorily resolve the subtle and com-
plex issues that arise in labor disputes.
255. H. EDWARDS, R.T. CLARK, JR. & C. CRAVER, LABOR RELATIONS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
666 (2d ed. 1979); D. ROTHSCHILD, L. MERRIFIELD & H. EDWARDS, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AND LABOR ARBITRATION 284-85 (2d ed. 1979); Feller, supra note 14, at 742.
256. Note, Duty of Fair Representation in Grievance Administration, supra note 3, at 186.
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Arbitration of grievances is a private method of self-regulation that is sup-
ported and sanctioned by the national labor policy.257 Section 203(8) of the
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 provides:
Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is hereby declared
to be the desirable method for the settlement of grievance disputes arising
over the application or interpretation of an existing collective bargaining
agreement .... "I
The grievance process serves four primary functions. First, it provides the
interested parties a relatively inexpensive and expeditious means of settling
disputes. Second, it provides the employee with the knowledge that the
ultimate resolution of his grievance will rest with a neutral third party, or
panel, rather than solely with his employer. Third, the private resolution
process conserves judicial resources. Finally, and most significantly, the
grievance procedure serves the national labor policy of maintaining labor
peace.259
The process is an alternative to the strike in the resolution of traditional
and reoccurring labor disputes.260 In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills,26' the Supreme Court established that "the agreement to arbitrate
grievance disputes is the quid pro quo for an agreement not to strike." '26 2
In other words, the employer agrees to submit a dispute to final and binding
arbitration in exchange for the union's promise not to strike over that issue
prior to the arbitration award. This arrangement contributes to stable and
peaceful labor relations.
The establishment of a grievance procedure is closely related to the
exclusivity principle. Section 9(a) of the NLRA265 provides that a union,
selected by a majority of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit,
shall be the employees' "exclusive representative . . . for the purposes of
collective bargaining. . ". .. " The proviso to section 9(a) permits individual
employees to present their grievances to their employer.26 Notwithstanding
257. H. EDWARDS, R.T. CLARK, JR. & C. CRAVER, supra note 255, at 665. For instance,
§ 203(d) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 provides:
Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is hereby declared to
be the desirable method for the settlement of grievance disputes arising over the
application or interpretation of an existing collective bargaining agreement ...
29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1949).
258. See, e.g., Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962); Textile Workers
Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
259. H. EDWARDS, R.T. CLARK, JR. & C. CRAVER, supra note 255, at 665.
260. Id.
261. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
262. Id. at 455; see also United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574,
583 (1960).
263. For text of § 9(a), see supra note 4. For a discussion of the exclusivity principle, see
supra note 9 and accompanying text.
264. See supra note 4.
265. See T. BoYcE, FAIR REPRESENTATION, THE NLRB AND THE COURTS 11 (Labor Relations
and Public Policy Series No. 18, 1978).
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this proviso, the overwhelming majority of collective bargaining agreements
provide for exclusive union control over employee complaints in a grievance
procedure ending in final and binding arbitration.26 6 Moreover, the parties
to a collective bargaining agreement usually provide that the grievance pro-
cedure established in the collective bargaining agreement will be the exclusive
procedure for resolving grievances arising under the contract.
2 67
b. Nonexclusive Access Grievance Procedure
Bowen limited the union's potential liability in a grievance procedure to
which it does not have exclusive access.26 The Bowen Court developed this
limitation in distinguishing Czosek. While Czosek involved an alternative pro-
cedure to the one provided in the collective bargaining agreement, Bowen's
analysis of Czosek applies to a single grievance procedure in which an in-
dividual could process his grievance over the union's objection.
In Czosek, the employees had an alternative grievance procedure under
the Railway Labor Act. This procedure permits an employee to pursue his
grievance, without the union, against the employer when the union fails to
process his grievance.269 The Czosek Court viewed the employee's claim
against his union as separate from the employee's statutory right to pursue
his claim against his employer.2 71 Czosek held that "judgment against [the
union] can in any event be had only for those damages that flowed from
[its] own conduct. . . . [D]amages against the union for loss of employment
are unrecoverable except to the extent that its refusal to handle the grievances
added to the difficulty and expense of collecting from the employer.".2 7'
In Bowen, the Court interpreted Czosek as consistent with its opinion.
The Bowen Court viewed the Czosek scenario as one in which the union
"did not increase the damages the employer would otherwise have to pay
[because the] union's conduct did not deprive the employees of immediate
access to a remedy."2 '2 Therefore, in such a suit, the only damages flowing
from the union's wrongful conduct were the injured employee's added
expenses. The Bowen majority viewed this analysis as consistent with Vaca's
holding that each party should be responsible for the damages caused by
its fault.273
266. Lehmann, The Union's Duty of Fair Representation-Steele and Its Successors, 30 FED.
B.J. 280, 282 n.15 (1971).
267. Bowen, 103 S. Ct. 588, 596 (1983).
268. In Bowen, the grievant had access to an alternative procedure. Bowen could have ap-
pealed his discharge to the Civil Service Commission; however, his right to do so expired 15
days after he receive notice of the Postal Service's action. Bowen would have waived his access
to the contractual remedies had he selected the administrative procedure. Because Bowen chose
the grievance procedure provided by the collective bargaining agreement, he was prevented from
subsequently presenting his claim to the Civil Service Commission. Bowen, 103 S. Ct. at 592 n.5.
269. See 45 U.S.C. § 153 (i), (j) (1976).
270. 397 U.S. at 28.
271. Id. at 29.
272. 103 S. Ct. at 599.
273. Id.
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The Bowen Court recognized that a union becomes the exclusive represen-
tative in a contractual grievance procedure by acquiring exclusive control
of the procedure through collective bargaining.274 In response to Bowen, the
union could attempt to negotiate a grievance procedure for "just cause"
cases, such as discipline and discharge actions, in which the union does not
have exclusive access to the procedure.275 It is arguable that these cases im-
pact the entire collective bargaining unit to a lesser extent than policy
questions.7 6 The just cause cases are likely to involve the application of
a clear contractual provision to a unique and disputed set of facts.277 Policy
issues, however, such as promotions and seniority, have a broad impact on
the bargaining unit because they place the rights of one employee against
the rights of another employee. 78 Moreover, a policy issue is likely to re-
quire the interpretation of an ambiguous provision in the collective bargain-
ing agreement, and such a ruling will govern the rights of all the bargaining
unit members prospectively.7 9
Pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement governing such a grievance
procedure, the resolution of just cause matters would not have any preceden-
tial impact on future cases. The procedure would not provide for resolution
of grievances through final and binding arbitration. An employee could select
the union to process his grievance. As an alternative, the employee, at his
own expense, could process his grievance or retain an attorney or nonunion
agent as his representative in the procedure.28 °
In the nonexclusive access procedure, if the employee selects the union
to process his grievance, the union will be guilty of breaching its duty of
fair representation if its conduct violates the fair representation standards
established in Vaca. Under such circumstances, Bowen held that the union
would be liable only for the added expenses that the employee eventually
incurred in processing his claim against the employer. This liability is based
on the fact that the employee had the right to process his own grievance
in the nonexclusive procedure. Accordingly, the union's conduct did not in-
crease the amount of damages the employer would otherwise have to pay
because the union's breach did not deprive the employee of immediate access
to a remedy. Therefore, the only damages flowing from the union's breach
of duty would be the employee's added expenses.28 '
274. Id. at 596 n.14.
275. The general concept of the alternative grievance procedure proposed in this article
is derived from the following: Telephone interview with Kathy Krieger, Attorney, United
Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, Washington, D.C. (March 14, 1983); Inter-
view with Anton G. Hajjer, Attorney, O'Donnell & Schwartz, Washington, D.C. (March 15,
1983) [hereinafter cited as Interviews, Krieger & Hajjer].
276. Id.
277. See generally R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW 389 (1976).
278. See Interviews, Krieger & Hajjer, supra note 271.
279. See generally R. GORMAN, supra note 277, at 389.
280. See Interviews, Krieger & Hajjer, supra note 275.
281. A recent district court decision recognized that Bowen provided for limited liability in
the context of an alternative grievance procedure. See Parker v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 555
F. Supp. 1182, 1185 n.10 (D.D.C. 1983).
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The negotiation of a nonexclusive access procedure, which Bowen implicitly
suggests may be used by unions to limit their liability, is neither a realistic
nor beneficial option for the union. This procedure will not serve the in-
terests of the union or the employer. The union's interest282 will not be served
by negotiating a procedure in which it does not have exclusive control of
processing discharge and discipline cases. The Supreme Court has recognized
that the union's "conscientious handling of grievance claims will enhance
the union's prestige with employees." '283 A union will not be able to enhance
its prestige among members of the bargaining unit if it does not have a
role to play in processing grievances over discharges and disciplinary measures;
these sanctions are crucial to the individual employee. Moreover, an employee
may be reluctant to support a union that is not absolutely committed to
representing her interests in these critical areas. In addition, an effective
grievance procedure is recognized as a strong asset in any union organiza-
tion campaign. The union's failure to negotiate a comprehensive grievance
procedure may harm the union's future efforts to organize new members.
The benefits that a union may receive, in terms of limiting its potential
liability for damages under Bowen, do not outweigh the threat of losing
permanent support from present and potential members.
An employer is unlikely to agree to a nonexclusive access grievance pro-
cedure for two reasons. First, in light of Bowen's interpretation of Czosek,
the employer would be liable for all of the employee's back pay when the
union's breach of duty consists solely in its failure to process the employee's
grievance. Second, such a grievance procedure will not provide for final and
binding arbitration. As a result, the employer will subject itself to the threat
of a strike over each discharge or other disciplinary measure. As previously
outlined, the Supreme Court has established that an employer's agreement
to arbitrate grievances is the "quid pro quo" for a union's agreement not
to strike.28 ' Moreover, the Court in Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour...
held that the employer's agreement to submit an issue to final and binding
arbitration creates an implied promise on the part of the union not to strike
over that issue prior to the arbitration award. In the nonexclusive access
procedure, without final and binding arbitration, there will not be any union
282. For a general discussion of the union's interests as the exclusive bargaining represen-
tative in the collective bargaining relationship, see Cheit, supra note 14, at 34.
283. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 653 (1965).
284. See supra notes 256-58 and accompanying text. In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 454 (1957), the Court stated:
The chief advantage which an employer can reasonably expect from a collective
bargaining agreement is the assurance of uninterrupted operation during the term
of the agreement. Without some effective method of assuring freedom from economic
warfare for the term of the agreement, there is little reason why an employer would
desire to sign a [collective bargaining] contract.
Id.
285. 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
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promises, express or implied, not to strike regarding grievances involved in
such a procedure.286
An employer's interest will not be served by agreeing to a contractual
grievance procedure in which the employer subjects itself to liability for all
of its employee's back pay damages and a work stoppage over every unre-
solved discharge or disciplinary grievance during the term of the agreement.
Moreover, this result undermines the union's role as exclusive bargaining
agent and is antithetical to the express national labor policy favoring grievance
and arbitration as the most desirable method of resolving labor disputes.
c. Arbitration Policies
In response to Bowen, a union may adopt one of three general arbitra-
tion policies. First, the union may process an increased number of grievances
to arbitration. Second, the union could develop a rigid internal standard
to limit the number of cases that qualify for arbitration. Finally, the union
has the option of merely rededicating itself to performing its duty of fair
representation effectively.
1. Increase the Number of Arbitrations.-The union may adopt a policy
in which every grievance is processed to arbitration, or a significantly in-
creased number of complaints are arbitrated. Bowen's threat of devastating
liability for back pay damages is a legitimate justification for such a posi-
tion. Nevertheless, a union procedure which requires and ensures that all,
or even an increased number of, grievances will be arbitrated is contradic-
tory to national labor policy.
As the exclusive bargaining agent of the employees, the union has a right
to use its discretion in administering the grievance and arbitation machinery.287
The Supreme Court expressly recognized this right in Humphrey v. Moore,2 8
in which the Court stated:
The complete satisfaction of all who are represented is hardly to be
expected. A wide range of reasonableness must be allowed a statutory
bargaining representative in serving the unit it represents. . . . Just as
a union must be free to sift out wholly frivolous grievances which would
only clog the grievance process, so it must be free to take a position on
the not so frivolous disputes.289
In Vaca, the Court reiterated this view by noting that it did "not agree
that an individual employee has an absolute right to have his grievance taken
to arbitration regardless of the provisions of the applicable collective bargain-
ing agreement." 290
In general, unions have limited financial resources for administering col-
286. See Feller, supra note 14, at 757-58.
287. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191, 194 (1967).
288. 375 U.S. 335 (1964).
289. Id. at 349.
290. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191 (1967).
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lective bargaining agreements. 9 ' Implicit in the union's right to use discre-
tion is its right to marshall its funds for arbitrating only meritorious
grievances. 92 This concern was articulated by Judge Hug in his dissent in
Tenorio v. NLRB.293 He stated that "[i]n addition to [the union's] respon-
sibility to protect the rights of aggrieved members, [it] has a duty to its
membership as a whole to expend its resources wisely." 2 9 Accordingly, a
union's scarce financial resources may be a legitimate basis for the union's
decision not to process a grievance to arbitration.295
A firm practice of processing an increased number of cases to arbitration,
regardless of their individual merits, will harm the interests of both the in-
dividual and the bargaining unit membership as a whole. The union will
be forced to allocate its resources to many frivolous grievances. The employees
with meritorious grievances will be deprived of the thorough representation
to which they are entitled because the union will be devoting its resources
toward arbitrating an increased number of grievances. Thus, the meritorious
grievances may be inadequately investigated and presented, resulting in an
award favorable to the employer. This result does not serve the employees'
interest in fair and effective union representation in the contractual grievance
procedure.
Similarly, because unions have limited financial resources for administer-
ing collective bargaining agreements, the union's treasury will be depleted
if it processes virtually every grievance to arbitration. First, the arbitration
process is costly; 96 the union's mere participation in an increased number
of arbitrations will deplete its treasury even further. Second, due to the in-
crease in arbitrations, the union may not have the time or money to in-
vestigate, prepare, and present the meritorious grievances properly at each
stage of the procedure. As a result, subsequent to an arbitration award, a
dissatisfied grievant may sue the union for breach of its duty of fair represen-
tation. An increase in such suits and a continued pattern of inadequate
grievance representation will gradually result in the union losing the con-
fidence and support of the employees it represents.
The parties' collective bargaining relationship may be harmed by a union
policy requiring a significantly increased number of grievances to be pro-
cessed to arbitration. The union's arbitration policy may force the parties
to sacrifice the traditional benefits of the settlement process in contract ad-
ministration. In negotiating a grievance and arbitration procedure, each party
contemplates that the other will act in good faith to settle grievances prior
to arbitration. ' 97 This is not an implied agreement to indemnify the other
291. W. Isaacson, supra note 1, at D-6.
292. Id.
293. 680 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1982).
294. Id. at 605 (Hug, J., dissenting) (cited in W. Isaacson, supra note 1, at D-6).
295. VanderVelde, supra note 1, at 1145; see Curth v. Faraday, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 678 (E.D.
Mich. 1975); Encina v. Tony Lama Co., 316 F. Supp. 239 (W.D. Texas 1970), aff'd, 448
F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1971).
296. VanderVelde, supra note 1, at 1145.
297. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191 (1967).
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party for liability incurred in breaching the agreement, but rather, it is a
legitimate expectation arising from the collective bargaining agreement. The
settlement process allows frivolous grievances to be resolved prior to arbitra-
tion, the most costly and time consuming stage of the proceeding.298 The
settlement of cases creates the potential for future problems to be handled
similarly and for problem areas in the interpretation of the contract to be
addressed and resolved. 99 Bowen implicitly imposes an obligation on the
union to indemnify the employer for a portion of the liability incurred in
breaching the contract, while potentially destroying the traditional benefits
of the settlement process in the administration of a collective bargaining agree-
ment. Furthermore, if Bowen forces the union to arbitrate more grievances,
the union and the employer will have to reconsider the benefits of agreeing
to a final and binding arbitration procedure.3 0 In light of this potential
development, it is ironic that the Bowen Court viewed its apportionment
analysis as necessary to maintain the employer's interest in agreeing to final
and binding arbitration."'
The Bowen rule may force the employer to refuse to agree to traditional
arbitration provisions. The Bowen decision limits the employer's potential
liability for back pay damages. Accordingly, he may not want to agree to
final and binding arbitration. It is conceded that he will be faced with a
potential strike over every grievance. Nevertheless, the employer may be will-
ing to take the risk. If the union processes every grievance to arbitration,
the employer will have to participate in these costly and time consuming
proceedings. To avoid the effort and expense of arbitration, the employer
may refuse to agree to arbitration and dare the union, and his employees,
to strike. Current economic factors provide employers with increased im-
munity from labor strikes. The nation's consistently high unemployment rate
creates an abundant supply of labor.30 2 Also, in the first fifty weeks of 1983,
the first-year wage settlements of collective bargaining agreements in all in-
dustries showed an actual decline of 2.5% from the corresponding period
in 1982. 11 This reduction in the median first-year wage increase reflects the
unions' willingness to accept wage concessions to preserve their members
employment. Moreover, a strike over a grievance would be an economic
strike,3"4 allowing the employer to hire permanent replacements for the
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. See infra notes 297-302 and accompanying text.
301. Bowen, 103 S. Ct. at 597.
302. Through December 1983 the national unemployment rate for the civilian population
was 8.2%. N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1984, at 1, col. 1.
303. 1983 D. LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 248, B-5.
304. An excellent summary of the distinction between economic and unfair labor practice
strikes is set forth in THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 33, at 1007, where it is stated:
Section 2(3) of the [NLRA] provides that strikers retain their employee status
while on strike. Whether they have an absolute right to reinstatement, however,
depends primarily upon whether the stoppage is determined to be an unfair labor
practice strike or an economic strike. An unfair labor practice strike is strike activity
initiated in whole or in part in response to unfair labor practices committed by
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striking employees." 5 Therefore, in light of the fact that unions may decide
to arbitrate more grievances, the reduction of employers' potential liability
in breach of contract cases, and the present state of the economy, Bowen
provides the employer with a legitimate incentive to refuse to be bound by
traditional arbitration provisions.
2. Internal Union Standard.-A union may establish a clear policy that
raises its internal standards for processing grievances to arbitration.' 6 Pur-
suant to such a policy, a case will not be arbitrated unless it fits into one
of the few categories of arbitrable cases. For example, the union could decide
that only discharge cases will be arbitrated. This practice would allow the
union to concentrate its resources on investigating, preparing, and presenting
meritorious discharge cases without being subjected to unfair representation
suits fo.r failing to arbitrate less serious grievances.
This response, however, suffers from the same weaknesses as the non-
exclusive access grievance procedure. The union will not be benefitted because
it may not be viewed as an effective representative by present and potential
members. The individual employee also will not benefit because throughout
the grievance process he will not receive effective representation on matters
crucial to his employment status.
3. Recommitment to the Duty of Fair Representation.-Bowen does not
provide a clear standard for apportioning damages between the union and
the employer. Accordingly, a union's most logical and practical response
to Bowen may be a recommitment to performing its duty of fair representa-
tion effectively. In so doing, the union should reevaluate its grievance handl-
ing procedures to ensure that each grievance is promptly and thoroughly
investigated. Also, the grievant should be kept fully advised as to the status
of her case.3 ' If the union decides not to process the grievance, the employee
should be promptly informed of the union's decision and the reasons for
that decision.30 8 If the union decides to process the grievance, the union of-
ficials should present the grievance in a comprehensive and well-reasoned
manner at each stage of the proceeding. The union's renewed commitment
to its responsibility as the exclusive bargaining representative will serve the
interests of the individual employee. The employees' bargaining agent will
be acting in a positive, consistent, and aggressive fashion to enforce the
the employer. An economic strike is one that is neither caused nor prolonged by
an unfair labor practice on the part of the employer. Although economic strikes
generally are used in attempting to enforce economic demands upon the employer,
such an object is not an absolute requirement.
Id.
305. See NLRB v. International Van Lines, 409 U.S. 48, 50 (1972); NLRB v. Mackay Radio
& Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938).
306. See generally Interviews, Krieger & Hajjer, supra note 275.
307. B. FELDACKER, supra note I, at 383.
308. Id.
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employees' rights against their employer. The union's interest will also be
served because the work force will view the union as a fair and effective
representative in the grievance procedure.
Additionally, the union's renewed effort will help it to avoid many fair
representation suits." °9 Employees are less likely to sue their union when it
handles their grievances in a consistent and efficient manner. When such
suits are filed, the union's conscientious performance will diminish its risk
of being found guilty of a breach of duty. In Bowen, the Court neither
addressed nor modified the standard established in Vaca for determining
whether the union breached its duty of fair representation. A union's recom-
mitment to performing its duty of fair representation effectively is a prac-
tical way to avoid the potential liability for damages under the Bowen
decision.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Bowen establishes a new standard for
apportioning damages between the union and the employer in hybrid sec-
tion 301 suits. The Bowen Court held that when an employee has been
wrdngfully discharged, her union may be held primarily liable for the
employee's increased damages, in the form of lost earnings, caused by the
union's breach of its duty of fair representation. The Court expressly did
not adopt a precise rule for apportioning damages. Nevertheless, the Court's
reasoning indicates that it favored a rule holding the union solely responsi-
ble for all of a wrongfully discharged employee's back pay damages accruing
after a hypothetical date upon which an arbitration award would have issued
if the union had processed the employee's grievance to arbitration. Yet Bowen
is not limited to such an interpretation.
The Court clearly held that a union may be found liable for back pay
damages when its breach of duty consists solely in failing to process an
employee's grievance. This holding contradicts the principles and interests
previously established, and consistently recognized, by the Supreme Court
and the federal appellate courts.
Finally, Bowen does not provide the courts and the interested parties clear
guidance regarding the governing standard for apportioning damages bet-
ween the union and the employer. As a result, Bowen's precise impact will
be determined by further judicial consideration and the response of employers,
unions, and employees.
In Bowen, the Supreme Court significantly altered established judicial prece-
dent without providing reliable guidelines to govern collective bargaining rela-
tionships in the future. Therefore, Bowen fails to serve the traditional in-
terests and goals of the national labor policy.
309. Id.
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